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Character and Passion in Virgil's *Aeneid*

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The subject of this essay is characterisation in Virgil's *Aeneid*, especially the presentation of emotions or passions. The focus is on two - very famous - portrayals of emotion, Dido's trajectory from love to hatred and self-destruction in Book 4 and Aeneas' anger-driven killing of Turnus in Book 12. My main interest is in exploring the possible relevance of ancient philosophical views of emotions,[1] and, in particular, the linkage between this factor and two other influences on characterisation in the *Aeneid*: political or ideological connotations and allusions to other literary works or 'intertextuality'. As regards philosophy, I suggest that Virgil draws on a variety of modes of understanding emotions and that this contributes to the subtlety of characterisation in the poem. On the other hand, the three factors examined (philosophy, politics and intertextuality) are seen here as reinforcing each other, rather than pulling in different directions.

Interpretation of characterisation in the *Aeneid* tends to be polarised between two competing kinds of reading. One view sees the poem as unified, though perhaps in a complex way, by a pro-Roman, pro-Augustan ideological stance. The other presents the poem as fractured between two, or more, authorial 'voices'; characterisation may reinforce ideology or may undercut it, for instance by giving a surprisingly sympathetic treatment of figures who are not Roman-Augustan symbols, such as Dido or Turnus.[2] The discussion here is closer to the first view in offering a unified reading which is broadly compatible with Roman-Augustan objectives. On the other hand, I emphasise some points that might not seem to form part of this pattern. Although Dido's story, taken overall, is seen as one of error and disintegration, she emerges as a more substantial figure, politically as well as morally and psychologically, than one might expect in this type of reading. Aeneas' killing of Turnus is also interpreted here, on balance, as an ethical lapse; this view is often associated with the 'two-voices' reading, though here it is seen as compatible with a certain type of pro-Augustan stance. However, my focus is less on trying to substantiate a new critical

interpretation than on showing how examination of the philosophical colour of Virgil's characterisation can form part of an integrated reading of the poem.

DIDO

What are the political, intertextual and philosophical strands which are combined in the characterisation of Dido? There are two well-marked historico-political allusions in Book 4: to the Antony-Cleopatra affair, especially in the report of *Fama* in 4.191-5, and to the future wars between Rome and Carthage, above all in Dido's curse (4.622-9).[3] Those motifs, as well as underlying the narrative, also help to shape two of its central themes, which are portrayed in a less negative light than one might have expected.[4] One is that of a female monarch who seeks to advance her political situation by an erotically based alliance with a Roman (or *ur*-Roman) leader in a way that proves disastrous for both of them and ends in her suicide. The other is that of a highly civilised state whose politico-cultural identity is defined, in important ways, by differentiation from its African context, and whose historical development is centred on contact with, and, ultimately, destruction by, Rome. Those narrative themes are worked out through a complex network of allusions to earlier literature; but a special role is played by Virgil's fusion of the portrayals of Medea by Euripides and Apollonius of Rhodes, combined at certain points with Ariadne's lament in Catullus 64. The key stages of Dido's story carry strong echoes of one or other, or sometimes both, of those versions of Medea. These stages are: Dido's hesitant and faltering response to the intense impact of her love for Aeneas, her outrage at Aeneas' failure to maintain (what she sees as) reciprocal favour and good faith, her deliberative self-address in response to this failure and, finally, hatred and destructive revenge coupled with harm to herself.[5]

Virgil's presentation of Dido is coloured by those political and intertextual strands. It is also, I think, shaped by contemporary ways of understanding - and evaluating - emotions. The question of the relevance of philosophical thinking on emotions (in particular, Aristotelian, Epicurean and Stoic patterns of thinking) has been explored most fully in connection with anger in the *Aeneid*, in particular, Aeneas' killing of Turnus in a state of passionate rage. But the question of the psychological basis and ethical status of emotions, which is a key issue in philosophical works by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the period just before Virgil, has a more general relevance to characterisation in the poem. The tendency of scholars has been to argue for the significance of *one* of these philosophical models for the poem. In his intellectual and personal life, Virgil, like some of his readers, may have had a single philosophical allegiance.[6] But, within the poem, it is more plausible, I think, to see Virgil as deploying all three frameworks eclectically, in quite subtle and complex ways, to inform his characterisation, alongside his use of political and intertextual connotations.[7]

The main features of these frameworks, as they bear on the presentation of Dido, are these. In the Aristotelian pattern, emotions such as anger and pity are seen as, in principle, appropriate and justified responses to actions of benefit or harm. In Book 4, this pattern is most evident in the argument between Aeneas and Dido about whether or not Aeneas' decision to leave marks a breach in reciprocal ethics.[8] In Stoicism, by contrast, emotions, as ordinarily understood, are seen as ethically misguided and as psychological disturbances or 'sicknesses'; emotions thus form a characteristic part of non-rational (in Stoic terms, 'foolish' or 'mad') behaviour. In Book 4, as I have argued elsewhere, the main Stoic motif is the presentation of Dido's surrender to her

passionate love for Aeneas as triggering a descent into uncontrollable irrationality and, in some sense, 'madness'.[9] In Epicureanism, especially as presented by Lucretius, a comparable theme is that passionate love is a product of delusion or self-delusion. This forms part of the larger Epicurean critique of the 'empty' character of most emotions and desires and is linked with the idea that most people fail to understand their real, underlying, fears and desires.[10] In Book 4, the presentation of Dido's surrender to love and her subsequent emotional confusion can be seen as reflecting the Epicurean view of emotions as, typically, deluded, in a way that runs alongside, and reinforces, the Stoic critique of passions.

I now outline the main story-line in Book 4, as a basis for closer study of Virgil's fusion of political, intertextual and psychological strands in his characterisation of Dido. A salient theme is that Dido's love for Aeneas represents a breach in her *fides* to her dead husband Sychaeus. The prominence of this theme has proved difficult to explain fully.[11] But the most plausible explanation, I think, is that Dido's status as queen, together with the political identity of the community she leads, is bound up with continued dedication to the memory of the Phoenician aristocrat whose murder and the attempted theft of whose gold led Dido to found the colony of Carthage. Her attitude to Sychaeus, initially at least, is one in which political, religious, ethical and emotional commitments come together.[12] This may account for another well-marked motif in the story, Dido's refusal to marry the African king Iarbas or any other African leader.[13] This can be linked, in turn, with the implied theme that poetic Carthage (like historical Carthage or Cleopatra's Egypt) has a cultural as well as political identity distinct from that of its African hinterland. Virgil's Carthage is presented as a politically and artistically 'high' culture, strongly aware of other high cultures and major world events (above all, the war between Greeks and Trojans) and separate from that of its African neighbours.[14] The Trojan settlers represent another, high-culture group who are determined to maintain their political identity; and the recognition of this similarity seems to underlie Dido's readiness to offer the Trojan exiles the prospect of uniting with her people.[15] Anna, indeed, argues that this is a reason for Dido to give way to her love for Aeneas and to form a politically advantageous marriage-alliance (4.36-49). But this plan is in conflict with Dido's *fides* to Sychaeus (4.15-29), which carries ethical and emotional, as well as political, weight. The proposal is also, of course, at odds with Aeneas' mission to found a city in Italy, the reiterated theme of his two-book narration to Dido.

This background explains why the idea of giving way to her love for Aeneas presents itself to Dido (as well as her Roman readers) as a *culpa*; and the 'akratic'character of her act, its being against her better judgement, is underlined in her words and those of the narrator.[16] The problematic and internally conflicted nature of her decision is mirrored on the divine level. Dido's surrender to the force of her love and the outcome of this surrender (sexual union with Aeneas in the cave) are presented as the product of the collusion of two goddesses who are deceiving each other and have contradictory objectives.[17] Aeneas, awakened to the fact that the affair is in conflict with his Italian destiny, seeks to end the relationship (265-95, 331-61). Dido's reactions represent an unstable mix of anger at Aeneas' breach in reciprocity and self-blame for breaking her *fides* to Sychaeus. It becomes clear to her that her political and ethical identity (her role as the respected and effective queen of her settlement and the associated *fides* to Sychaeus) have both been lost. Her curse on Aeneas and the Trojans and her self-killing express anger at broken reciprocity and also the desire to escape from an impossible ethical and political situation.

This outline is designed to underline that, in Virgil's story of Dido, political and personal strands are intimately linked. The judgements that the poetic figures make on each other and themselves (and those which are invited in the poem's readers) reflect this seamless web of political and personal relationships.[18] Those judgements are framed in ways which evoke Aristotelian, Stoic or Epicurean patterns of thinking; and the patterns deployed have a bearing on the kind of judgements that are made or invited. The intertextual allusions, in particular to versions of the Medea-story, serve as a further way of defining and colouring the emotional register of the narrative. I will illustrate these kinds of interconnection by reference to a series of passages which mark the main stages of Dido's emotional trajectory.

KEY STAGES IN DIDO'S TRAJECTORY

The first passage falls within the dialogue in which Dido is persuaded by her sister Anna to act on her passionate love for Aeneas. Dido's decision is marked as 'akratic' by her characterisation of the desire for marriage with Aeneas as a *culpa*, a source of blame (4.19). This is because it runs counter to her *fides* to Sychaeus, which she here re-affirms (4.15-29). Anna's counterargument is that Dido should not give such weight to *fides* to a dead person and that marriage with Aeneas, and union with his people, would have substantial political advantages (4.33-49). However, her advice seems also, and primarily, to be responding to Dido's partly disclosed intense erotic attraction to Aeneas; and, in the sisters' subsequent joint actions, erotic rather than political concerns are given prominence.[19] The dialogue contains these lines, spoken by Dido, and concludes with the subsequent narrative comment:

> *si mihi non animo fixum immotumque sederet*
> *ne cui me uinclo uellem sociare iugali,*
> *postquam primus amor deceptam morte fefellit;*
> *si non pertaesum thalami taedaeque fuisset,*
> *huic uni forsan potui succumbere culpae.* (15-20)
>
> *his dictis impenso animum flammauit amore*
> *spemque dedit dubiae menti soluitque pudorem.* (54-5)[20]

In lines 15-20, the mixed conditional is perhaps slightly surprising, and the indicative *potui*, rather than a subjunctive, might seem to leave open a possibility that the two if-clauses ostensibly rule out. However, the more striking phrase is *succumbere culpae*; one might have expected a term such as *uiro* or *amori* (if scansion allowed) to end the line. The phrase seems to combine first-personal and third-personal perspectives; *culpa* is a term with which an external critic might characterise her readiness to respond to her desire. The narrative comment in 54-5 makes explicit the ethical self-surrender implied in her words.[21]

How far do intertextual or philosophical parallels inform this dialogue? In *Argonautica* 3, the dialogue between Chalciope and her sister plays a similar role in encouraging the hesitant Medea to act on the basis of her intense, though concealed, love (*erôs*), rather than her sense of shame (*aidôs*).[22] But the 'akratic' character of the Virgilian dialogue, indicated especially in the phrase *succumbere culpae* (4.20) is prefigured, rather, by the famous monologue in Euripides' *Medea*, particularly its concluding lines, 1078-80: 'I know that what I am about to do is bad (*kaka*), but anger is master of my plans, which is the greatest source of human beings' troubles'. These lines,

like *Aeneid* 4.15-20, combine an agent's first-personal perspective with the kind of characterisation of the psychological process that a critical observer might make.[23] These lines were, apparently, the favourite poetic text of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, and were used to illustrate the conflicted state of mind of those acting in the grip of emotion. In the Stoic view, even those acting in passion are capable of recognising, in some sense rationally, that they are acting irrationally; the combination of a (passionate) agent's perspective with that of a (rational) observer in Medea's words exemplify this paradox.[24] Both associations, those of the famous Euripidean text of *akrasia* (*Med.* 1078-80) and of the Stoic model of passion as conscious surrender to irrationality, illustrated especially by that text, underlie and colour the unexpected phrase *succumbere culpae*.[25] Those associations may, in turn, be combined with the Epicurean conception of passion as delusion and self-delusion. Dido's opening speech to Anna is rich in the kind of persuasive description of a loved one that Lucretius presents as promoting the error (as Epicureans see it) of passionate love.[26] Also, Anna's ethical and political justification for giving way to love (4.33-49) serves as a more subtle mode of persuasive redescription, reflecting the Epicurean analysis of the complex ways in which people deceive themselves about their real motives.

The second passage forms part of Dido's speech to Aeneas, responding to his planned departure.

dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum
posse nefas tacitusque mea decedere terra?
nec te noster amor nec te data dextera quondam
nec moritura tenet crudeli funere Dido?...
te propter Libycae gentes Nomadumque tyranni
odere, infensi Tyrii; te propter eundem
extinctus pudor et, qua sola sidera adibam,
fama prior. cui me moribundam deseris hospes
(hoc solum nomen quoniam de coniuge restat)?
quid moror? an mea Pygmalion dum moenia frater
destruat aut captam ducat Gaetulus Iarbas? (305-8, 320-26)

Here, at least at first sight, the emotional idiom is strongly Aristotelian: Dido's anger (in 305-8) and her appeal for pity (in 320-6) are presented as justified responses to Aeneas' actions.[27] As with the earlier passage, and despite the different emotional mode, the tone is reinforced by intertextual allusions to the versions of Medea[28], here combined with echoes of Catullus' Ariadne. There are specific verbal echoes (particularly, *perfide*, *data dextera*) of the language in which, in these earlier texts, Medea blames Jason (or Ariadne Theseus) for actual or apparent failure in reciprocal ethics. In particular, Medea blames Jason for his failure to recognise the special obligation created by Medea's rescue of him and by her abandonment of her natal family and the added weight this gives to their marriage-bond.[29] But those very echoes contribute to destabilising the ethical force of Dido's complaints and her appeal. Is the *amor* actually 'ours' (*noster*), that is, Aeneas' as well as Dido's? With what significance was Aeneas' (or Dido's) right hand given (306)? It was not, at any rate, that of a marriage acknowledged on both sides, as was the case with Medea. Also, in what way, exactly, was Aeneas the source or ground (*propter te...propter te*) of the hostility of the rejected African suitors and of her own people?

The latter part of the speech reflects the impact that their affair has had on her political and ethical *persona* as an independent queen whose refusal to marry Iarbas or any other African leader was grounded on her *fides* to Sychaeus. Here, she holds Aeneas responsible for this impact (*propter te*), and cites this and its likely outcome (her death at the hands of her enemies or enforced marriage to Iarbas) as a ground for reproach or for pity and continuation of the relationship. But her anger and appeal for pity are at least partly undercut by her own responsibility in activating an erotic affair that she herself recognised as being in conflict with her ethical and political commitments.[30] In philosophical terms, the Aristotelian tone of the emotional language is underlaid, and partly undercut, by the Stoic colour of her earlier conscious surrender to error. From an Epicurean standpoint, her accusations and appeals to Aeneas are underpinned by self-delusion (a central theme of Epicurean thinking on emotions), as she seeks to persuade Aeneas, and herself, that he is the sole agent of an outcome that she at least partly anticipated.[31] Hence, in these lines, the layered connotations, especially those of different ways of conceiving and evaluating emotions, serve to define Dido's psychological state and its ethical quality.

en, quid ago? rursusne procos inrisa priores
experiar, Nomadumque petam conubia supplex,
quos ego sim totiens iam dedignata maritos?...
quid tum? sola fuga nautas comitabor ouantis?
an Tyriis omnique manu stipata meorum
inferar et, quos Sidonia uix urbe reuelli,
rursus agam pelago et uentis dare uela iubebo?
quin morere ut merita es, ferroque auerte dolorem.
tu lacrimis euicta meis, tu prima furentem
his, germana, malis oneras atque obicis hosti.
non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine uitam
degere more ferae, talis nec tangere curas;
non seruata fides cineri promissa Sychaeo. (534-6, 543-52)

These lines form part of a deliberative monologue by Dido on the night before the Trojans leave. The form of the deliberative monologue goes back to Homer's *Iliad*, and is used to special effect by Euripides' (and Apollonius') Medea, though the closest parallel, also ending in the decision to commit suicide, is in Sophocles' *Ajax*.[32] Though sometimes described as incoherent,[33] her deliberation has a clear - and at one level rational - structure. She considers and rejects these options: (1) seeking marriage with one of the previously rejected African leaders, (2) sailing with the Trojans as a private individual, (3) inducing her community as a whole to sail with the Trojans. She finally embraces self-killing as the only available way out of her situation.[34] She blames her sister and, in effect, herself for choosing what turned out to be an unacceptable course of action, embarking on an extra-marital affair with Aeneas (trying to form a liaison *more ferae*)[35] and thus of breaking her *fides* to Sychaeus. One option notable for its absence is that of resuming her former role as autonomous monarch of Carthage. Her deliberations reflect the fact that emotionally, as well as ethically and politically, this *persona* has become untenable for her as a result of her chosen actions and their consequences.[36]

Although her deliberations in this sense follow a rational sequence, they are also intensely emotional, as indicated in the introductory narrative:

...ingeminant curae rursusque resurgens
saeuit amor magnoque irarum fluctuat aestu. (531-2)

The *amor* underlies options (2) and (3) above, and the *magnus aestus irarum* is apparent in the bitterly sarcastic rhetorical questions with which she articulates the three options. The anger, like the love, is in a sense directed at Aeneas for placing her in this impossible situation, though by the closing lines the anger has been refocused on Anna or herself. The emotional pattern expressed in these lines is better understood in Stoic or Epicurean than in Aristotelian terms. She outlines three courses of action, none of which she regards as fully credible (as her sarcastic tone indicates), and which she then rejects. In this respect, like Euripides' Medea in 1078-80, she acknowledges the irrationality of what she (verbally, at least) considers doing; in more Epicurean terms, she acknowledges that the options outlined are an expression of self-delusion.[37] This final recognition that her (now untenable) situation derives from her own actions and Anna's represents, in Stoic or Epicurean terms, a more fully rational attitude, though one pervaded by deep sadness (*tantos questus*, 553) at the terrible outcome.

uixi et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi,
et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago.
urbem praeclaram statui, mea moenia uidi,
ulta uirum poenas inimico a fratre recepi,
felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum
numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae. (654-8)

These famous lines, spoken just before Dido's suicide, also express a kind of rationality. Dido delivers her own obituary or *res gestae*. The stance she adopts, calmly assessing her achievements and situation and doing so from a quasi-cosmic perspective, has both Epicurean and Stoic analogues.[38] However, her calmness here is achieved by negating her earlier recognition of her own role in producing this outcome; the loss of the *persona* she had at the start of Book 4 is presented, in the counterfactual if-clause (*si... numquam...tetigissent...carinae*, 657-8), in terms that negate personal agency, even that of Aeneas.[39] The rational tone is also, on the face of it, in sharp contrast to her physical situation, on the top of a funeral pyre for her quasi-marital bed with Aeneas and about to die by plunging his sword in her breast (642-50, 663-5). Her situation evokes famous tragic suicides such as Sophocles' Deianeira or, in another way, Ajax (and also that of the historical Cleopatra), each of whom, particularly Deianeira, had contributed significantly to the events leading to this result.[40] Like Ajax, Dido intends her self-killing to serve as an exemplary gesture, dramatising the ethically untenable situation of the self-killer but also casting blame on those who precipitated her death. Like Ajax, Dido precedes her self-killing with a terrible curse on those who have induced her to perform this act, though in Dido's case, this is coupled with acknowledgement of her own role in precipitating the relevant sequence of actions.[41] Hence, the quasi-Stoic rationality or Epicurean calm of Dido's lines (654-8) is heavily qualified by its context and implications. The 'philosophical' tone is at odds with the expression of the passions of anger, vengeance and wounded love in Dido's words and actions before and after these lines.[42] But, in a different way, the two tones work together to characterise Dido's ethical and emotional state at her death. Her death is in one sense a rationally chosen act in an untenable situation and is preceded by a brief attempt to recall her lost ethico-political identity. But the death is also the outcome of the torrent of overpowering emotion and misjudgment (viewed predominantly from a Stoic or Epicurean standpoint) that has been the dominant feature of the whole disastrous cycle of events.

In the case of Dido, I have suggested that historico-political allusions (to historical Carthage and Cleopatra) help to frame a narrative which is further coloured by intertextual motifs (particularly, echoes of Medea and Ariadne) and by a subtly layered use of philosophical frameworks for understanding emotions. The characterisation, though complex and probing, is, as I read it, unified, and not fractured into distinct ideological and sympathetic or empathetic strands. If this view is credible, can a similar claim be made about another famous example of Virgilian characterisation?

AENEAS' KILLING OF TURNUS

> *ille humilis supplex oculos dextramque precantem*
> *protendens...stetit acer in armis*
> *Aeneas uoluens oculos dextramque repressit;*
> *et iam iamque magis cunctantem flectere sermo*
> *coeperat, infelix umero cum apparuit alto*
> *balteus et notis fulserunt cingula bullis*
> *Pallantis pueri, uictum quem uulnere Turnus*
> *strauerat atque umeris inimicum insigne gerebat.*
> *ille, oculis postquam saeui monimenta doloris*
> *exuuiasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira*
> *terribilis: 'tune hinc spoliis indute meorum*
> *eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc uulnere, Pallas*
> *immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.'*
> *hoc dicens ferrum aduerso sub pectore condit*
> *feruidus...* (12.930-1, 938-51)

In this case, unlike that of Dido, the potential relevance of philosophical frameworks has been much discussed. I will outline the main alternatives before suggesting my own view, and also indicating how, in my reading, intertextual and political colour reinforces the philosophical tone. Any interpretation of these famous lines needs to account for at least three striking features. These are (1) the reason for Aeneas' pause as he considers granting Turnus' appeal for pity, (2) the significance of Aeneas' sudden change of mind as he sees Pallas' sword-belt, and (3) the effect of the language with which Aeneas embraces, and the narrator characterises, the decision to kill Turnus.

The 'Aristotelian' reading (which need not presuppose the direct influence of Aristotelian thought)[43] assumes as standard the kind of characterisation of anger offered by Aristotle himself:

> Let anger be defined as a desire, accompanied by pain, for revenge at what is taken to be an insult to oneself or those close to one, in a situation where insult is not appropriate...Every case of anger must be accompanied by a certain type of pleasure, namely that which derives fom the hope of taking revenge. (Arist. *Rhet.* 1378a30-2, b2-3)

More broadly, emotions such as anger are taken to be (in principle) justified responses to appropriate or inappropriate interpersonal behaviour. Hence, in this context, Aeneas is first of all swayed by pity, understood as another interpersonal emotion,[44] at Turnus' appeal, which is replaced by a surge of anger at the sight of Pallas' sword-belt. The sword-belt triggers anger because it evokes Pallas' death at Turnus' hands, which was a source of intense anger and grief in Aeneas.[45]

Also, it evokes Evander's grief-laden injunction on Aeneas to avenge his son's death by killing his murderer; more broadly, it evokes the theme of justified anger or merited grief which is a significant strand in Books 8 and 11.[46] Aeneas' final response, his being 'inflamed' (*accensus*, *feruidus*) with anger, his intense bitter words and violent action, signal the response of someone who feels himself wholly justified in his anger and in acting as the agent of Pallas' revenge (*poenas*).[47]

The Epicurean reading is, on this point at least, closer to the Aristotelian than the Stoic. The Epicureans distinguish 'natural' from 'empty' anger. 'Natural' anger is, first, an unavoidable fact of human psychology and, second, an appropriate response to harm or provocation, particularly when deliberate. Natural anger may be shown, and in an intense form, by someone with a good character (*diathesis*), who is not typically prone to anger, if a correct examination of the situation shows that anger is appropriate. A key point of distinction from the Aristotelian view is that anger is not seen as pleasurable, but, rather, as painful; pursuing revenge as a source of pleasure is a mark of 'empty', misguided, anger.[48] Hence, in this case, Aeneas' willingness to suppress revenge and to show pity is a mark of the good, reasonable character or attitude displayed in earlier cases such as Lausus.[49] The shift from forebearance to (natural) anger is brought about by recognition that this response is merited by the killing of Pallas. However, there is no sign, it is claimed, that Aeneas is presented as one securing pleasure through revenge. He seeks revenge on Pallas' behalf (*Pallas ... Pallas...poenam...sumit*), while aware of the grim, painful nature of the task (*saeui monimenta doloris*).[50]

The Stoic reading, like the Epicurean, stresses the fact that, elsewhere in the poem, Aeneas is often characterised as refraining from violent anger in situations where it might be expected. Hence, for instance, he is held back by his divine mother from frenzied anger and revenge against Helen in Book 2. He also enters the war against the Italians in Book 8 and re-enters it in Book 11 in a mood of sorrowful concern for the inevitable deaths on both sides rather than as someone activated by a spirit of justified anger. His killing of Mezentius' son Lausus, the parallel to Turnus' killing of Pallas, is marked by pity rather than anger.[51] A characterisation of the properly Stoic state of mind in such situations is offered by Seneca:

> (Someone might ask) 'Doesn't the good person get angry if he sees his father murdered, his mother raped?' He will not get angry, but he will seek retaliation and defend them... 'If my father is being murdered, I shall defend him; if he is murdered, I will seek retaliation - because it is my duty (*oportet*) not because I feel hurt (*dolet*)'. Seneca, *de Ira* 1.12.[52]

Against this background, Aeneas' readiness to respond to Turnus' appeal for pity emerges as a characteristic and reasonable response, and perhaps one that expresses a more generalised, 'cosmic', sense of humanity.[53] The sudden shift of plan triggered by the sight of Pallas' sword-belt appears, by contrast, as a virtually 'akratic' impulse. It is marked as a 'passion' (non-rational, excessive, uncontrolled) by the narrative language (*furiis accensus et ira/terribilis...feruidus*), and by Aeneas' use of the language of human sacrifice (*immolat*). Although the reiteration and alliteration (*Pallas...Pallas...scelerato ex sanguine sumit*) of Aeneas' words express urgent intensity, the use of the third-personal form may suggest that Aeneas is implicitly distancing himself from acts and attitudes that he would elsewhere repudiate.[54]

I think it is clear that this passage is more difficult to interpret than the passages illustrating Dido's emotions considered earlier, and that a case can be made out for each of these readings.

Also, the passage does not straightforwardly match an Aristotelian or Stoic norm in the way that some previous passages do (for instance, those expressing the idea of justified or repudiated anger).[55] Each of the readings also encounters difficulties or, at least, raises issues. The main difficulty for the Aristotelian reading is that the presentation of Aeneas as expressing full-hearted engagement with vengeful anger runs counter to most at least, though not all, of his previous attitudes.[56] The Epicurean reading is, on this point, more apposite, since it accommodates the idea of an atypical outburst of (justified) anger in a characteristically mild-tempered person.[57] However, it is not wholly clear that Aeneas' state of mind in the final lines matches the Epicurean norm of someone going towards punishment as something 'most unpleasant' and 'gritting his teeth' (*daknôn*).[58] Aeneas is described as carried away by intense, burning emotion (*furiis accensus et ira/terribilis...feruidus*), expressed also in his bitter, reiterative words, which is not the state of mind associated with the Epicurean good person. So, overall, the Stoic reading seems most plausible, on the assumption that, on this occasion, and under the pressure of this situation, Aeneas fails to live up to the Stoic-type norms which are elsewhere set for him and which he often matches.[59] This reading perhaps best explains the puzzling fact that the passage shows Aeneas *nearly* reacting in a different way (with forebearance). It may also explain why Aeneas' final words and described state of mind have an uncharacteristic brutal intensity and are marked by other connotations (frenzy or Furies, *furiis*, and human sacrifice, *immolat*) which are particularly disturbing at the very close of the poem.[60]

The Stoic type of reading can be seen as reinforced by intertextual and political considerations (though it has to be acknowledged that competing readings make the same claim). The obvious intertextual parallel here is the close of one or other Homeric epics. It would be possible to see Aeneas as, in general, patterned on the more self-controlled of the two Homeric heroes, namely Odysseus; and to see the two phases of Aeneas' reactions in this scene as an accelerated version of Odysseus' response in the final books of the *Odyssey*, first conspicuously checking his anger (20.1-21) and then, with equal force, releasing it (Book 22). However, if this parallel is invoked at the end of the *Aeneid*, it is only in a rather generalised way; also, the characterisation of the nature and grounds of Odysseus' self-control is very different from that of Aeneas.[61] More immediately germane is the end of the *Iliad*. Turnus' call for pity, coupling an appeal in his father's name with a reference to Aeneas' own revered father, constitutes a strong echo of the terms in which Priam couches his plea to ransom his dead son's body.[62] Although Turnus' use of this appeal is more problematic than that of Priam (who is supplicating for the body of his son),[63] it is the kind of appeal to which we would expect Aeneas to be more responsive than Achilles. Aeneas has already shown himself capable of standing outside his own immediate situation and pitying others (including enemies) affected by his actions.[64] Hence, the fact that Aeneas, unlike Achilles in *Iliad* 24, does *not* grant supplication is the more disturbing, given the Iliadic echo; and it confirms the impression, registered in the Stoic reading, that Aeneas here falls below the standards of conduct and attitude that he sometimes reaches elsewhere.

But how would this reading square with a plausible interpretation of the political connotations of these lines? It is sometimes argued that Aeneas' symbolic role as the bearer of Roman, and specifically Augustan, destiny, makes it inconceivable that Virgil would end his epic by showing Aeneas in a negative light. Also, it is pointed out that, by contrast with Julius Caesar, who followed an explicit, and ultimately fatal, programme of *clementia*, Augustus presented himself as *ultor*,

first of Caesar's killers and subsequently of the Parthians.[65] As Karl Galinsky points out, Ovid in *Fasti* 5.575 re-uses Virgil's phrase *scelerato sanguine* in characterising the avenging role of Augustus in connection with the final dedication of the temple of Mars Ultor (in 2 BC).[66] On this view, the political connotations of the final lines support an Aristotelian or Epicurean reading.

However, it is possible to interpret the political context in a way that is more compatible with the Stoic reading. After Actium, Augustus adopted a more inclusive policy, focused on peace-making and consolidation; and poets such as Horace and Virgil seem to have encouraged, or reflected, this new approach.[67] The shift was formalised in the inclusion of *clementia* as one of the four virtues on the symbolic shield presented to Augustus in 27 BC. This shift informs Augustus' retrospective account of his policy in the *Res Gestae*: his response to Caesar's killers is presented as moderate and legally based, and he claims to have spared those asking for mercy.[68] Within the *Aeneid* itself, the programmatically 'Roman' speech of Anchises advocates the ideal of *pacique imponere morem,/parcere subiectis*, while the final divine council in Book 12 celebrates the peace-making union of Trojans and Italians.[69] If we give weight to these features, we can see Aeneas' first reaction, that of anger-free *clementia*, as the more statesmanlike one, and his final outburst of vengeful anger as a lapse from standards that could, at this date, plausibly be seen as Augustan. Accordingly, as Harris stresses, to see this reaction as a lapse does not mean that the poem ends on an anti-Augustan, anti-Roman note.[70] Rather, Aeneas - not for the first time - reverts to a more typically heroic, indeed, Achillean, anger,[71] rather than displaying the magnanimity which an actual Augustus (like Achilles in *Iliad* 24) might have shown.

So, taking all three factors together, I think there is a reasonable case for seeing the Stoic reading of the final scene as supported by intertextual and political considerations. However, the aim of this discussion has not been to argue that the *Aeneid* is systematically Stoic in its characterisation and presentation of emotions. On the contrary, I have maintained that the poem deploys all three contemporary ways of understanding emotions as part of a subtle register of characterisation. I have also suggested that, in these cases at least, the psycho-ethical mode adopted can be seen as consistent with the predominant colour of the intertextual and political indicators. In this respect at least, the poem seems to have a single, though complex, voice rather than falling apart into divergent tones.[72]

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NOTES

[1] See also S. M. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997), especially C. Gill, 'Passion as Madness in Roman Poetry', 213-42; also C. Gill, 'Reactive and Objective Attitudes: Anger in Virgil's *Aeneid* and Hellenistic Philosophy', in S. Braund and G. Most (eds.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, YCS (2003), 208-28.

[2] See S. Harrison 'Some Views of the *Aeneid* in the Twentieth Century', in Harrison (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Vergil's Aeneid* (Oxford, 1990), 1-20. For recent contributions to this debate, see K. Galinsky, 'Greek and Roman Drama and the *Aeneid*', in D. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *Myth, History and Culture in Republican Rome: Studies in Honour of T P Wiseman* (Exeter, 2003), 275-94 (representing the more unified view) and R.F. Thomas, 'A Trope by any Other Name: "Polysemy", Ambiguity and *Significatio* in Virgil', *HSCP* 100 (2000), 381-407, and *Virgil and the Augustan Reception* (Cambridge, 2001), especially 25-54 (arguing for diversity of voices and questioning the basis of the Augustan reading). See also C. Martindale (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Virgil* (Cambridge, 1997), especially A. Laird, 'Approaching Characterisation in Virgil', 282-93, and the discussions of modern and ancient reception of Virgil by D. Kennedy (38-55) and R. J. Tarrant (56-72).

[3] See further A.S. Pease (ed.), *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos: Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), notes on 4.193, 622-9, also pp. 24-8.

4 N. Horsfall, 'Dido in the Light of History', in Harrison, *Oxford Readings*, 127-44, brings out the historical connotations, but seems to me to overstate the negative quality of Virgil's presentation.

5 For these stages, and intertextual parallels, see the next section below. See further R.C. Monti, *The Dido Episode and the Aeneid* (Leiden, 1981), 102-3, outlining key parallels; C. Collard, 'Medea and Dido', *Prometheus* 1 (1975), 131-51; W. V. Clausen, *Virgil's Aeneid and the Tradition of Hellenistic Poetry* (Berkeley, 1987), 40-60; D. Nelis, *Vergil's Aeneid and the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius. ARCA*, Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs 39 (Leeds, Francis Cairns, 2001), especially 136-40, 159-72.

6 External evidence links Virgil with the Epicurean school (see e.g. M. Gigante and M. Capasso, 'Il ritorno di Virgilio a Ercolano', *SIFC* 7 (1989), 3-6, on a papyrus fragment suggesting Virgil was a member of Philodemus' circle); but the internal indications are more complex. For the contrast between Stoic and Aristotelian approaches in this period, see e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 3.71-6, 4.37-47; on Lucretius, see n. 10 below, and on Philodemus, *On Anger*, see n. 48 below. See also references in n. 1 above.

7 Are readers expected to detect the philosophical implications of Virgil's characterisation? This question is no easier to answer than in the case of other forms of allusion. It seems to me that (1) the poem emerges as richer if the allusions are recognised, but also (2) that the philosophical frameworks give added depth to the presentation of emotions whether or not the intellectual background is specifically identified by the reader.

8 *Aen.* 4.305-87; on 305-8, see text to n. 27 below. See Arist. *Rh.* 2, especially 2.2, 2.8. The Aristotelian approach corresponds to a well-marked strand in ancient (or modern) conventional thinking on emotions; hence, we can talk about an 'Aristotelian' approach without presupposing the direct influence of Aristotle. See Braund and Gill, *Passions in Roman Thought*, 6-8; and, on the linkage between the Aristotelian analysis of pity and Greek and Roman thinking, D. Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London, 2001).

9 See further A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987), section 65; C. Gill, 'Passion as Madness' (n. 1 above), especially 228-9, 237; more broadly, J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Dordrecht, 1998).

10 See (on erotic passion), Lucr. 4. 1037-1207, on failure to recognise underlying fears and desires, Lucr. 3.31-93, 1053-94; also Long and Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers*, section 21, especially B, E. See further M.C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, 1994), chs. 5-6.

11 The usual explanation is the Roman ideal of being *uniuira*; see e.g. N. Rudd, 'Dido's *Culpa*', in Harrison, *Oxford Readings*, 145-66, especially 154-60; but it is not clear why this ideal should be so important to the Carthaginian queen.

12 See *Aen.* 1.340-68, 4.15-29; note also the shrine to Sychaeus (4.457-9). My reading is here indebted to T. D. Hill, '*Ambitiosa Mors:* Suicide and the Self in Roman Thought and Literature', University of London PhD thesis, 2003, 129; also Monti, *Dido Episode*, 21-2, 32, 69.

13 *Aen.* 4.36-8, 211-14, 534-6.

14 The high culture (establishment of a legal framework, artistic sophistication) is underlined in the initial picture of the emerging Carthage, above all, the murals representing the Trojan War. See 1.418-93, especially 426, 507-8 (laws), 450-94 (murals). The African neighbours are presented as war-like and threatening (4.40-3, cf. 1.523, 563-4), though not lacking in their own form of cultural development (Iarbas has 100 temples to Jupiter Ammon, 198-218). One might compare with Dido's initial attitude the ethico-political stance of Elizabeth I, after her decision to remain the 'Virgin Queen', a decision linked with English autonomy from the other European powers with which England would otherwise have been linked by her marriage.

15 4.522-78. See also Monti, *Dido Episode*, 16-22, 33.

16 4.19, 54-5, discussed below; for *culpa*, see also 4.171-2.

17 4.90-128, which is superimposed on the prior presentation of Dido's love as the product of Venus' divine intervention, 1.657-722, 4.1-5. I assume that divine intervention in Virg. *Aen.*, while signalling the presence of an intense psychological force (or a larger world-historical significance), does not wholly take away individual human responsibility for actions. Otherwise the presentation of Dido as, in effect, deciding to give way to the power of her love, through the dialogue with Anna in 4. 8-55, makes no sense. See further on gods 'working with' human emotions, R.O.A.M. Lyne, *Further Voices in Vergil's Aeneid* (Oxford, 1987), 66-71, also D.C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic* (Oxford, 1991), 164-80.

18 On this point, see also Monti, *Dido Episode*, 35, 40-3, 56-7, 61.

19 4.38, cf. 19, 22-3 (and 1-5), 54-9, 66-9, 82-5, terminating with *amorem*, and followed by the interruption of her queenly role in carrying forward the construction of her city, 86-9. See further F. Cairns, *Virgil's Augustan Epic* (Cambridge, 1989), 43-6.

20 The text used for these and other quotations from Virg. *Aen.* is the OCT of R. A.B. Mynors, *P. Vergili Maronis* (Oxford, 1969).

21 See also the use of *culpa* in another critical narrative comment in 4.171-2: *nec iam furtiuum Dido meditatur amorem:/coniugium uocat, hoc praetexit nomine culpam.* Pease (n. 3 above), note on 4.19, and Rudd (n. 11 above), 152, register, but do not explain, the fusion of first- and third-personal language in *succumbere culpae*.

22 See Apoll. *Arg.* 3.673-743 (dialogue between sisters), Medea's hesitations (645-63, 771-801), conflict between desire and shame (649, 652-3, 681, 687), Medea's indirectness about her love (687-92) and Chalciope's ready response (697-704); see further Clausen, *Virgil's Aeneid*, 41-3, Nelis, *Aeneid and Argonautica*, 136-9. A further (partial) parallel is Phaedra's dialogue with the nurse in Eur. *Hipp.*

[23] On this translation, and on interpretation, of these famous lines, see C. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue* (Oxford, 1996), 223-5.

[24] See further C. Gill, 'Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?', *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 136-49, *Personality*, 227-32, 'Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, *Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, 118-21.

[25] The phrase is adopted, in similar style, in Ov. *Met*. 7.748-50; the more flagrantly paradoxical Ov. *Met*. 7.19-21 and Sen. *Phaed*. 177-9 probably derive directly from Eur. *Med*. 1078-80.

[26] See Lucr. 4.4.1153-70 and n. 10 above.

[27] On the Aristotelian mode, see n. 8 above and text to n. 43 below.

[28] See Eur. *Med*. 465-519, especially 476, 482-5, 514-15; for the 'right hand', 496; on the ethical basis for the revenge of Euripides' Medea, see Gill, *Personality*, 154-74, especially, 156, 158-62. See Apoll. *Arg*. 4.355-90, especially 372-3, 387-9; Nelis, *Aeneid and Argonautica*, 160-3. See also Cat. 64.132-63, especially *perfide...perfide* (132-3), *promissa...conubia* (139-41), *certe ego...eripui* (149-50).

[29] Contrast Virg. *Aen*. 4.165-72, 338-9, with Apoll. *Arg*. 4.1128-69, anticipated in 4.95-8, 355-9; see further Nelis, *Aeneid and Argonautica*, 148-52, 160-1 (also Eur. *Med*. 10-19, 21-2). Even if Aeneas acted as a husband might have done (e.g. 4.260-4) his denial of marriage (338-9) is not challenged by Dido in 365-87. For a different way of understanding the significance of *dextra*, as referring to Dido's generous hospitality and protection, see *Monti*, *Dido Episode*, 3-8, 41-2.

[30] See discussion of 4.15-20 above. As indicated in 4.36-41, Iarbas was already angry at his rejection and the other Africans threatening; what has changed is that the moral-political basis of her rejection of African suitors (her *fides* to Sychaeus and her role as an autonomous monarch) has been lost, as is registered in Iarbas' words in 211-16.

[31] This is not, of course, to suggest that Aeneas has no responsibility and is in no way blameworthy; but to explore his responsibility fully would require separate discussion.

[32] See Hom. *Il*. 1.404-10, 17.91-105, 19.553-70, 22.99-130; Eur. *Med*. 364-409, Apoll. *Arg*. 636-44, 3.771-801; Soph. *Ajax* 457-80, with the implicit re-affirmation of this decision in 646-92; on these Greek deliberative monologues, see Gill, *Personality*, ch. 1 and 204-14. See also Cat. 64.177-87, terminating with the expectation of death (*letum*, 187).

[33] For instance, R. G. Austin (ed.), *P. Vergili Maronis: Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Oxford, 1955), notes ad loc.

[34] For these stages, see 4. 534-6, 537-543, 544-6, 547. The deliberation is well analysed in Hill (n. 12 above), 136-7.

[35] 4. 548-52, cf. text to n. 19 above, also the animal simile of 4.68-73 (a reference I owe to Jonathan Foster). There may be an allusion to the love-making of primitive men and women (Lucr. 5.962-5) who live like animals (970) before the emergence of (pre-verbal) families (1010-14) . In this reading of *more ferae* (551), I follow Pease (n. 3 above), rather than Austin (n. 33 above); see their respective notes on 550-1.

[36] This is made explicit in 4.596-7: *infelix Dido, nunc te facta impia tangunt?/tum decuit, cum sceptra dabas. Monti, Dido Episode*, 62-5, stresses that the *facta impia* constitute, above all, the fact that she gave up her monarchic role to Aeneas.

[37] See nn. 10 and 23 above.

[38] E.g. Epicurus' famously calm and reasoned death-bed letter (Long and Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* 24D); for Stoic 'cosmic' detachment from one's situation, see e.g. Long and Sedley 58J (citing Chrysippus) or Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations, passim*.

[39] Contrast 548-52, 595-7, and 15-20. The phraseology recalls (again) Cat. 64.172-6 (*tetigissent* etc.), though Ariadne there more overtly blames Theseus.

[40] On these and other tragic parallels, see Clausen, *Virgil's Aeneid,* 53-60; for parallels between the deaths of Dido and Cleopatra, see Pease (n. 3 above), 26.

[41] Soph. *Ajax* 835-44; for his self-killing as an exemplary gesture, see Gill, *Personality*, 204-14; for Dido's curse, 607-29, preceded by acknowledgement of her own role, 595-7.

[42] Contrast 653-8 with 643-50, especially 642-6 (*effera...sanguineam uoluens aciem...furibunda*), and the *amor* implied in 651-2, and *ira* in 659-62; also the confused riot of emotions in 590-606.

[43] See n. 8 above.

[44] That is, the kind of interpersonal emotion discussed in Arist., *Rhet*. 2.8, and not the more generalised 'pity' sometimes recognised by Stoicism (see n. 53 below).

[45] 10.510-42, 552, 602-4, 11.26-9, 11.39-44.

[46] 11.177-81, cf. 10.515-17; 8.494 (*furiis iustis*), 8.501 (*merita ira*), the Argyllans angry at Mezentius; cf. 8.219-20, 8.228-30, Hercules angry at Cacus; 8.482-3, 8.500-1 (*iustus... dolor et merita...ira*), Evander angry on behalf of the Argyllans.

[47] For readings of this type, see e.g. K. Galinsky, 'The Anger of Aeneas', *AJP* 109 (1988), 321-48, M.R. Wright, '*Ferox uirtus*: Anger in Virgil's *Aeneid*', in Braund and Gill, Passions in Roman Thought, 169-84.

[48] See Philodemus, *On Anger*, especially 37.25, 41.3-5, 42.22-34, 44.20-2, 46.28-35; see further J. Annas, 'Epicurean Emotions', *GRBS* 30 (1989), 145-64; J. Procopé, 'Epicureans on Anger', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, *Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, 171-96, D.P. Fowler, 'Epicurean Anger', in Braund and Gill, *Passions in Roman Thought*, 16-35.

[49] See text to n. 51 below.

[50] See further M. Erler, 'Der Zorn des Helden, Philodems "De Ira" und Vergils Konzept des Zorns in der "Aeneis", *GB* 18 (1992), 103-26; K. Galinsky, 'How to be Philosophical about the End of the *Aeneid*', *ICS* 19 (1994), 191-201, especially 197-200.

[51] See 2.567-633, especially *furiata mente...indomitas...iras,/ quid furis*? (588, 594-5); *heu quantae miseris caedes Laurentibus instant*!... *quam multa sub undas/scuta uirum galeasque et fortia corpora uolues,/ Thybri pater* (8.536-40), *nos alias hinc ad lacrimas eadem horrida belli/fata uocant* (11.96-7); 10.808-32, especially *miserans... miserande puer* (823, 825). See further R.O.A.M. Lyne, 'Vergil and the Politics of War', CQ 33 (1983), 188-203, M. Putnam, 'Anger, Blindness, and Insight in Virgil's *Aeneid*', in M. C. Nussbaum (ed.), *The Poetics of Therapy* (= *Apeiron* 23.4), Edmonton, Alberta, 1990, 7-40, *Virgil's Aeneid: Interpretation and Influence* (Chapel Hill, 1995), ch. 8, especially 157-60.

[52] See further J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford, 1993), 62-6.

[53] For Stoic analogues to this attitude, see e.g. Marcus Aurelius *Med.* 2.1, Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.28.10; see further Gill, 'Reactive and Objective Attitudes' (n. 1 above).

[54] See further Gill, 'Passion as Madness', 239-40; also Lyne, 'Politics of War', 199-202, Putnam, 'Anger, Blindness, and Insight', 14-18.

[55] See nn. 46, 51 above.

[56] For avoidance of anger, see n. 51 above; for previous outbursts of anger by Aeneas, see 10.510-42, 12.494, 499, cf. 569-73, 580-2.

[57] See e.g. Philodemus, *On Anger* 34.31-35.5, taken with Galinsky, 'How to be Philosophical', 196.

[58] Philodemus, *On Anger* 44.20-2, 40.32-41.8; see also Annas, 'Epicurean Emotions', 159, Procopé, 'Epicurean Anger', 180.

[59] See nn. 51, 53 above.

[60] In *furiis accensus* (12.946), there is a disconcerting echo of Dido's self-description as *furiis incensa* (4.376). See R.F. Thomas, '*Furor* and *Furiae* in Virgil', *AJP* 112 (1991), 261-2, arguing against the view of Cairns, *Virgil's Augustan Epic*, 83-4, that *furiis* differs substantively in ethical colour from *furore*. For ways of reading *furiis* and *immolat* that render them less ethically problematic, see P. Hardie, 'The *Aeneid* and the *Oresteia*', *Proceedings of the Virgil Society* 20 (1991), 29-45, at 40-2, *The Epic Successors of Virgil* (Cambridge, 1993), 33-4.

[61] There is no suggestion in the characterisation of Odysseus that emotions such as anger should be avoided in general, only that it should be restrained in specific situations (see further on *Od.* 20.1-21, Gill, *Personality*, 183-90); contrast the more 'Stoic' aspects of Aeneas' reactions, nn. 51 and 53 above.

[62] Cf. *Aen*. 12. 932-8 with Hom. *Il.* 24.485-506. The Iliadic Achilles is, in general, not presented as a poetic paradigm for Aeneas; it is the wrath-prone Turnus who figures as 'the second Achilles' (6.89, 9.742). But in the later stages of the poem, Aeneas' outbursts of anger (n. 56 above) and avenging role bring him closer to the Homeric Achilles.

[63] The appeal of the aged king Latinus to Turnus to end the bloodshed (12.18-45) is, in this respect, a closer parallel to Priam's speech, as suggested by K. Galinsky, 'Greek and Roman Drama and the *Aeneid*' (n. 2 above), 285-6.

[64] See n. 51 above; note especially Priam's appeal to Achilles to pity his situation (*Il.* 24.493-506), to which Achilles responds in 24.543-51 (with a more generalised awareness of human suffering in 525-33).

[65] The transition is marked in Hor. *C.* 1.2, especially 21-4, 44-52, as underlined by W.V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), 244.

[66] Galinsky, 'How to be Philosophical', 201.

[67] On the shift in approach, see e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.86.2, Sen. *Clem.* 1.11.1. See also S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace: A Critical Study* (New Haven, 1962), 186, 190-204, referring to Hor. *C.* 1.2, 3.4, especially *lene consilium* (41), *uim temperatam* (66), also to Virgil's reading of the peace-focused *Georgics* (especially 1.498-514) to Augustus in 29 BC (Suet. *Vit. Virg*. 61).

[68] *Res Gestae* 34.2; 2: *qui parentem meum trucidauerunt, eos in exilium expuli iudiciis legitimis ultus eorum facinus* (i.e. lex Pedia); 3: *uictorque omnibus ueniam petentibus ciuibus peperci*. See Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 243-7, also referring to indications that Augustus was aware of the need for rulers to moderate anger.

[69] 6. 852-3, 12.818-41.

[70] 'We should get away from the idea that if Aeneas fails a moral text, the politics of the *Aeneid* cease to make sense', Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 247.

[71] See references in n. 56 above, especially 10.510-42.

[72] I am most grateful for helpful comments on oral versions of this article at a meeting of the Virgil Society in January 2003 and at the University of Victoria, British Columbia; also, for further detailed and suggestive comments on a previous written version, to Susanna Morton Braund, Philip Hardie, Ruth Parkes and Tim Whitmarsh.