

## *Vergil and Philosophy*

I met Deryck Williams first in 1939. I was a freshman at John's; he had just graduated and was embarking on research. We were both disciples of that great teacher Martin Charlesworth. More, we were both members of that remarkable fellowship Congsoc, the Congregational Society, and together sat at the feet of the richly beloved Henry Child (Polly) Carter. We remained life-long friends. I am proud to share in this tribute to his memory.

The Romans were ambivalent towards the Greeks. Their great powers of assimilation never quite embraced them. They claimed their own ancestry from the Trojans. In 196 BC they gave the Greeks freedom; in 146 BC they took it away. To Juvenal the Greeks were interlopers and predators, the hungry Greekling who eats you out of house and home, unstable, all things to all men. Yet they stood in awe of Greek culture. Literature was Greek literature, and it is the proudest boast of Roman writers to introduce some new aspect of Greek literature into Latin.

Ascraeumque cano Romana per oppida carmen

I sing the song of Ascræ through the towns of Rome

wrote Vergil (*G.* 2,176), and Propertius (2,34,66), paying his tribute to the nascent *Aeneid*, said

nescio quid maius nascitur Iliade

Something greater than *The Iliad* is being born.

Unless you were Cato the Censor, education was Greek. Aemilius Paulus had a variety of teachers for his children, all Greek (Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 6, 4–5). Quintilian recommended Roman children to embark on Greek before Latin (1,1,12). And philosophy was Greek. Cicero, the

great encyclopaedist of philosophy, who in the process gave Europe her philosophical vocabulary, wrote to Atticus (*Att.* 12,52,3)

verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.

My contribution is merely words, and I have plenty of those.

That was true: he had.

Ennius knew something of Greek philosophy; there are touches throughout his writings and he gave extended accounts of the views attributed to Epicharmus and Euhemerus. In the second century BC philosophers from Greece began to make their way to Rome. In 173 BC two Epicureans were expelled for 'introducing pleasures' (*Ath.* 12,547 A). Twelve years later, in 161, there was a general decree expelling philosophers and rhetoricians: the senate did not like innovations they had not introduced. In 155 a political embassy from Athens consisted of the philosophical leaders (though the Epicureans were excluded), Critolaus the Peripatetic, Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic. They caused a stir. They took the opportunity to give public lectures, to which the young Romans flocked, interestingly with the approval of their elders, Cato apart. Carneades was the chief sensation: he gave two lectures on justice on successive days, one pro and one con.

All three schools proudly and inventively traced their origins back to the magnetic, charismatic figure of Socrates. Socrates claimed to follow his mother's profession of midwife rather than his father's of sculptor: he did not mould people to his own design but enabled them to give birth to the thoughts that were in them. Nothing more clearly substantiates that claim than the extraordinary variety of beliefs held by his immediate associates.

Plato knew him only in old age and was perhaps not very close to him. Socrates had raised ethical questions. Plato found the answer to these and other problems in his Theory of Forms. According to this the things of this world, whether material objects or the manifestation of values, are imperfect and impermanent, dim reflections of the perfect, permanent Forms which are known to the intelligence only. The Academy was named after the area of Athens where he taught. By a curious quirk of history, for over a century they plunged into an epistemological scepticism which seems un-Platonic, modifying it by a doctrine of probability

(we can never say that an assertion is true, but we can say that it is probable). Hence Carneades. But Antiochus of Ascalon, who died about 68 BC, abandoned scepticism, and stressed the compatibility of the Academy with the Peripatetics and Stoics, especially in their common ethical stance traceable back to Socrates.

Aristotle did not know Socrates: he was born well after his death. But he studied with Plato. Ultimately his doctor father proved a deeper influence. Aristotle was the supreme biologist of antiquity, perhaps of all time. Darwin once said 'Linnaeus and Cuvier were the gods of my youth, but they were both of them schoolboys to old Aristotle.' In consequence he was ultimately committed, unlike Plato, to the solid reality of this world, to a material object as 'a sort of a this'. Theory was based on fact, biology on observation, political theory on the study of constitutions, literary theory on the study of works of literature. Dante called him 'the master of those who know'. His successors carried on. The great Museum or research-institute at Alexandria was the work of one of them. The first century BC saw the recovery of his lectures, lost from sight for a century, and the beginning of those commentaries which ossified rather than developed his achievement.

The Stoics were different. Their founder was Zeno, a Semite from Citium, a hundred years after Socrates. But Zeno was much influenced by Crates the Cynic (the word has changed its meaning). This school of thought went back to Diogenes who came from Sinope on the Black Sea, and was nicknamed the Dog. Socrates had a down-to-earth working-class associate named Antisthenes. A link was fabricated between him and Diogenes to complete the family tree. The Stoics placed a strong emphasis on ethical duty, preaching a high and somewhat priggish morality. They were pantheists, and in consequence predestinarians. The only thing God does not determine is our response. We are pawns in the divine game of chess. We may be sacrificed or we may be queened. Either way we are part of the divine plan. What matters is our willing acceptance of either role

*ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt*

Accept? The fates lead you. Refuse? They drag you.

Seneca *Ep.* 107,11

At the period of Vergil's life there was a strong tendency among these schools to fusion and eclecticism. The creators of Roman Stoicism, Panaetius and Poseidonius, both had tendencies to Platonize. Cicero, who liked to think of himself as an Academic, actually studied with the Epicurean Phaedrus as well as the Stoic Poseidonius and the Academic Philo. Diodotus the Stoic went so far as to study Pythagoras (Cic. *TD* 5,39,113). The Sextii formed a school which was Stoic in its ethics, Pythagorean in its vegetarianism, Platonic in its doctrine of the soul, Aristotelian in its botany and medicine, and which claimed to be native Roman. M. Brutus the tyrannicide was an Academic with Stoic leanings. Favorinus held to an Academic doctrine of probability and said that the greatest degree of probability attached to the Peripatetics. The process continued. In the second century AD Albinus attributed Aristotle's logic and his doctrine that virtue is a mean to Plato; in the third a man can be described as 'the Platonist and Stoic' (Porph. *V. Plot.* 17).

The Hellenistic Age was an age of uncertainty. All the philosophies were pursuing *autarcy*, self-sufficiency, independence of and superiority to hostile circumstances, the quality which Aldous Huxley called 'non-attachment'.

Three sects stood apart from the mainstream.

The Pythagoreans experienced something of a revival in the first century BC in Rome and Alexandria. Pythagoras was a shadowy figure who in the sixth century BC migrated from Samos in the Aegean to Magna Graecia, and somewhere, perhaps in Babylon, had acquired a familiarity with Indian thought. His system embraced music, mathematics (Pythagoras's theorem may be authentically his) and mysticism (including the doctrine of the transmigration of souls) in a vast synthesis, which made a practical impact on politics. Cicero's friend Nigidius Figulus, astrologer and grammarian, was a Pythagorean. So, in the following century was the wandering ascetic Apollonius of Tyana, who was to be used as a pagan counterblast to Christ. Their vegetarianism (based on the idea that souls might transmigrate into the bodies of animals) made them unpopular with the upper classes who did not like people to be different. We might say that the Pythagoreans were in search of religious autarcy.

The Cynics or Dog-Philosophers renounced all attachments, including nationality, possessions and family, going against all forms of convention. About 100 BC Meleager of Gadara incorporated Cynic doctrine in a

satirical writing. In Roman imperial times they appeared as a kind of Stoic left-wing—though their non-attachment to politics was in marked contrast to Stoic attitudes—and it is hard to tell whether people such as Musonius Rufus or Epictetus were Stoics or Cynics. The Cynics practised personal autarcy.

More important than either of these were the Epicureans, who formed the fourth major school alongside Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics. They have been much maligned. True that Epicurus spoke as if pleasure was the goal of life, but in reality he was a pessimist who said that we should pursue the course which offered the least excess of pain over pleasure. He did not approve of 'pleasures', and lived a life of high simplicity. True also that he did not believe in gods who might be influenced by prayer or sacrifice, but he believed in gods, blissful philosophers from whom waves emanated which those properly attuned might pick up to their benefit. The fourfold prescription of salvation ran 'God is not to be feared. Death is not felt. Good can be procured. Evil can be endured.' The things which shake us are fears and desires outrunning their natural course. Fears can be eliminated by a scientific understanding of the atomic structure of the universe, desires by renunciation of political or military or literary glory, and living simply in retirement in the shelter of a Garden, honouring friendship, which 'dances round the world calling us to awaken to the life of happiness'. The Epicureans are among the most attractive of ancient thinkers in their pursuit of a sort of social autarcy.

There is thus a marked contrast between Epicureans and Stoics despite the fact that both asserted that the wise man would be happy even on the rack. The Epicureans spoke of pleasure where the Stoics lauded duty. The Epicureans believed in free will, the Stoics in determinism: it is a convenient view for those in power to hold that they are there by the determinate will of God, and to tell the poor that their poverty is determined by the inscrutable blessing of providence. The Epicurean would not enter politics unless compelled to do so; the Stoic entered politics unless he was compelled not to do so. The Epicurean belonged to the Garden, in private retreat, the Stoic to the Porch, in the public eye. We can readily see why Augustus might favour the Stoics.

The last period of the Republic was a great period for the Epicureans at Rome. There was the Greek Phaedrus to teach the true doctrine. There were C. Velleius and T. Manlius Torquatus, who speak for them

in Cicero's pages; T. Pomponius Atticus, Cicero's friend and publisher; L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, father-in-law to Caesar and patron to Philodemus; L. Cornelius Sisenna, historian and governor of Sicily; M. Fadius Gallus, who opposed Caesar; C. Trebatius Testa, converted in Caesar's camp in Gaul in 53; C. Cassius Longinus, whose conversion in 46 did not lead him to renounce either soldiering or political assassination; Hirtius and Pansa, consuls in 43; C. Memmius, patron to Lucretius; Lucretius himself, and Philodemus, and Siro; C. Catus Insuber, one of the more attractive Epicurean writers, and a dozen more whom we can name, and presumably hundreds whom we cannot. These Romans on the whole did not renounce political and military office any more than Christians have remained true to the precepts of their founder. A surprising number of them came from Gaul, Cisalpine at least.

Cassius was prominent among Caesar's assassins, M. Fadius Gallus among his opponents. Augustus had no reason to love the Epicureans. More importantly they ran counter to the principles he wished to inculcate. He wanted a sense of public duty; they stood for withdrawal. He wanted to use religion as a foundation to the established order; they spoke of gods uninterested in human beings. He stressed the military virtues; their creed was pacifistic. He, whatever his private life, was in public a stern moralist; they were thought to 'teach pleasures' and their ways ran contrary to the *mos maiorum*. Augustus was a skilled autocrat. He avoided direct censorship so far as possible. But Epicurean watchwords are replaced by Stoic watchwords: we can see the process in Horace and Vergil. There seems to be a conspiracy of silence: Lucretius is read, but not named. De Witt wrote rightly in *Epicurus and his Philosophy*: "Thus Epicureanism, too strong to be uprooted, was forced to become anonymous" (p. 343).

Maecenas, patron of Horace and Vergil, is an interesting study in himself. Much of our knowledge of him comes from Seneca, who knew his Epicureans well. The famous verses (Sen. *Ep.* 101,11)

Debilem facito manu, debilem pede coxo  
tuber adstrue gibberum, lubricos quate dentes;  
vita dum superest, benest; hanc mihi vel acuta  
si sedeam cruce, sustine.

Make me weak in hand and crippled foot,

Pile on a crooked hump, shake my teeth loose.  
While life remains it is well; grant me that  
Even if I sit on the agonizing cross.

do not seem, as Seneca suggests, to be expressing an inglorious love of life so much as the authentic saying of Epicurus that the wise man will be happy even under torture. Other hints of Epicureanism appear—the lack of interest in the fate of his body (Sen. *Ep.* 92, 35); the danger of high places (Sen. *Ep.* 19, 9); the rejection of bloodshed (Sen. *Ep.* 114, 7); and the story of his disapproval of Augustus's executions in the words *Surge tandem carnifex* 'Time you got up, butcher', as Cedrenus records them); the indifference to style; the amount of time he spent in his own house and garden. Particularly Epicurean is his decision to live as an *eques*, out of the public eye, and to exercise influence without holding a position in the power-structure. And there is his genius for friendship. The great trait of his character was loyalty (Prop. 3, 9). He was patient with his lovely, infuriating wife, and 'remarried her a thousand times' (Sen. *Ep.* 114, 6). Horace called him 'half of my soul' (*Od.* 2, 17, 5). Many of his literary circle had Epicurean associations, and the circle itself seems almost an Epicurean *contubernium*, the only one we know in the capital itself.

Vergil was one. We know that somewhere around 48 BC he went to Campania and spent at least six years in the Epicurean community whose leading professor was Siro. Tacitus speaks of Vergil's *securum et quietum...secessum* and *felix contubernium* (*Dial.* 13): *securitas* is precisely the *ataraxia* or freedom from disturbance which the Epicureans sought. This period is reflected in the *Catalepton* or *Miniatures* which seem to be mainly authentic. Two of the verses refer to Siro (5; 8); there are pleasant lines addressed to Tucca and Varius (1; 7). A well-known fragment from Herculaneum (*Rh. Mus.* 1890 p. 172) testifies to the presence of Varius and Quintilius, and, by a reasonable restoration, to Plotius and Vergil too. Particularly Epicurean are the expression of friendship for Musa (4), and the invocation of *dulces Camenae*. *Dulcis*, while an ordinary Latin word, becomes a word of special significance in Epicurean circles, meaning 'pleasure-bringing', somewhat as the word 'friend' is a special word to Quakers. *Ciris* was written by an Epicurean, who was looking for wisdom in the Garden (*Ciris* 3): if it was not by Vergil, it was close enough to his attitudes to be attributed to him.

Servius (on *Aen.* 6,264) testified to the continuing influence of Siro on Vergil's thought. At this stage Vergil was a committed Epicurean.

Among the other associates of Siro were Plotius Tucca, one of Vergil's executors, friend of Horace, and member of Maecenas's circle (Hor. *S.* 1,5,40; 1,10,81); Varius, Vergil's other executor, who wrote a poem on Death which may have been Epicurean, a panegyric on Octavian, and a tragedy *Thyestes*; Quintilius Varus, who died in 24 BC, lamented by Horace (*Od.*1,24); probably Octavius Musa, mentioned by Horace with the others (*S.*1,10,82); and perhaps C. Valgius Rufus, a miscellaneous author, the obscure Visci (*S.* 1,9,22) and Aristius Fuscus, recipient of two of Horace's poems (*Od.* 1,22; *Ep.* 1,10). Of these some were certainly found in Naples, some were certainly in the circle of Maecenas, all are associated directly or indirectly with Epicurean attitudes; all retained warm friendships. We may suspect that Epicureanism faded in them, but the friendships of the Garden remained sturdy.

Horace was not in the Naples community, but he had close associations with many of them. It looks as if his father, to whose early training he owed so much, was an Epicurean (*S.* 1,6,65–88); certainly he himself learned of the blessed unconcern of the gods (*S.*1,5,101), and he calls himself whimsically but sincerely enough *Epicuri de grege porcum*, 'a porker from the herd of Epicurus' (*Ep.* 1,4,16). Epicurean values shine from his poems at all periods, in his utilitarianism, his praise of the simple life, his attacks on Stoic paradoxes, his joy in friendship, his acceptance of death as the end, his refusal to take thought for the morrow, his independence of Fortune, his exaltation of Maecenas as his *praesidium* (*Od.*1,1,2) i.e. the guarantor of *securitas*, his search for *otium*, his calculus of pleasures and doctrine of choice and avoidance, his precept and practice of 'living out of the public eye'. Sometimes he is almost paraphrasing Epicurus; frequently he uses Epicurean technical terms, *falsis vocibus* (*Od.*2,2,19–21), or in one stanza *tutus, sordidus, invidenda, sobrius* (*Od.*2,10,5–8). Pleasure (*dulci*) and utility (*utile*) combine to produce the best poetry (*A.P.* 343): both are technical terms. *Dulcis* is important to watch for. Maecenas is his *dulce decus* (*Od.*1,1,2). The combination is almost an oxymoron. Indeed one is tempted to render the familiar *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* as 'To die for your country is both Epicurean and Stoic' (*Od.*3,2,13).

For Horace moved away from the faith of his youth. In *Odes* 1,34 he tells how as *parcus deorum cultor*, infrequent in worship, he heard

thunder from a clear sky, to believers an omen, to unbelievers an impossibility (Lucr. 6,400). Horace heard it and thought 'Lucretius and Epicurus are wrong.' So we have the exaltation of Jupiter, the plea for rebuilding the temples, the acceptance of the commission to write the *Carmen Saeculare*, the idealization of the Stoic sage, *iustum et tenacem propositi virum* (Od.3,3,1). Not that he was a convert to Stoicism, as A.Y. Campbell wrongly inferred. Allegiance to any school sat lightly on him (*Ep.* 1,1,13–9), and he retained many Epicurean attitudes. Horace is interesting not least because his development in some ways parallels Vergil's.

By the time that Vergil wrote *The Eclogues* he was full of an assimilated Epicureanism. This comes out for example in Silenus's song (6,31) when he tells of the formation of the universe out of the seeds of the elements streaming through the void. But alongside this assimilated Epicureanism there is also a rejection of specific Epicurean doctrines, as in Damon's scorn *nec curare deum credis mortalia quemquam* (8,35), referring to the Epicurean view of divine indifference and non-intervention. The keyline is at the beginning of the first poem, where Tityrus says *deus nobis haec otia fecit* 'a god has produced this peace for us' (1,6). The exact sense is important. *Otia* was an Epicurean concept, the pleasure in retirement promised by Epicurus. And because Epicurus had shown humans the way to peace, Lucretius said of him *dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus, inclyte Memmi* 'I have to say it, he was a god, yes, noble Memmius, a god' (Lucr. 5,8). But Tityrus, by common consent, is referring not to Epicurus, but to Octavian. In other words Octavian has for Vergil taken Epicurus's place. The *pax Augusta* (as it was later called) has made irrelevant Epicurean quietistic philosophy. Political and public action has done the philosopher's work for him. The end is the same, but the means have changed.

The movement is still clearer in *The Georgics*. The keylines are in the second book (2,490):

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,  
atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum  
subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.  
fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis.

The exact translation is important.

How happy was the man who could understand the causes of things  
And trampled underfoot every fear,  
Inexorable fate, and greedy Acheron's roar.  
Blessed by fortune also is he who has come to know the countryside  
gods...

The indicatives imply definite people. The first is Lucretius; the words echo his. In the second Vergil is alluding to himself. He has passed from disbelief to belief; he has 'come to know'. Epicurus believed in gods but not gods of the countryside. In this Vergil is blessed by that Fortune with whom Epicurean wisdom had no dealings (*Epic. fr.* 77).

The outcome is fascinating. We might say that Aratus and Lucretius are struggling for mastery within him, and Lucretius does not always lose. For example the spontaneous generation of bees from a carcass (4,295 ff.) comes from a very odd passage in Lucretius (3,713 ff.). In all Merrill reckoned that one line in every twelve was derived consciously or unconsciously from Lucretius. The passage about *dulces...Musae* (2,475) is referred to by Tacitus in the context of Vergil's Epicurean quietism (*Dial.* 13) and echoes the *dulces Camenae* of *Catalepton* 5. Even more interesting is the anthropology of the first book (1,125 ff.) At first blush he has abandoned the Epicurean view altogether; a closer view shows that he has incorporated the Epicurean picture (e.g. 1,133 *usus*) within a framework of myth (1,125; 1,147). The same Epicurean insistence on *usus* is even clearer in the next book (2,22). Again the horror of war which ends the first book (1,461–514) is strongly Epicurean. Vergil regrets the beating of sickles into swords, and welcomes the conversion of a Corycian pirate into a gardener (1,508; 4,125 ff.). He rejects *negotium* and all the busyness of public life, and welcomes the *latis otia campis* (2,461 ff. cf. *Lucr.* 2,29–33). Even more striking is the rejection of love. The third book of *The Georgics* (3,209 ff.) is nearly as bitter as the fourth of Lucretius. Sexual intercourse is enervating (3,209); the idealized bees do not indulge in it (4,197). Love in *The Georgics* is disastrous, whether to Leander, Aristaeus, or Orpheus; in the Thracian women it is a power of destruction. *Mutatis mutandis*, Vergil's standpoint on love, is not significantly different from those of the later satirists Petronius and Juvenal, who use the sexual passion as symbolic of the *luxuria* they are assailing from a broadly Epicurean point of view. Even in the famous passage which attributes to bees a share of the

divine mind and which asserts a kind of panentheism (4,219 ff.), Vergil retains a certain ambivalence, being content to attribute the view to others (*quidam...dixere*). Still, ultimately the movement already observed in *The Eclogues* has gone further, and in the last lines he contrasts the *ignobile otium* which he enjoyed in the past at *dulcis Parthenope*, with Augustus's military glory and divine destiny (4,559 ff.).

In *The Aeneid* the change is completed. The theme of the glory of Rome is an impossible one in Epicurean terms. The world-picture is dominated by destiny. The famous philosophical passage of the sixth book is eclectic, linking traditional mythology with Stoic pantheism and some Pythagoreanism and Platonism. Thus the *anima mundi* appears in the words *spiritus intus alit* (6,725), and in deference to the Stoics the energy comes from fire (6,730 *igneus...vigor*). The whole is framed within Pythagorean metempsychosis, and the body appears as the prison of the soul, *soma sema* (6,734). But Epicureanism is absent.

Aeneas is depicted as a Stoic hero who goes through various tests. At three key moments in the first half of the poem he allows his emotions to overcome his reason in an un-Stoic manner. At the fall of Troy his courage is indisputable but useless. He believes Sinon's lies. He and his associates are forgetful of the past and blind to the future (2,244); true courage is mindful of the past and provident of the future (Cic. *Sen.* 78). As he tells the tale he can see his weakness (2,314)

arma amens capio, nec sat rationis in armis.

Out of my mind I seize arms; there is little reason in them.

He is projected into the fray by frenzy and anger (2,316–7). In his confusion of mind he loses his wife (2,735–6). His second failure is over Dido. He is governed by his emotions and oblivious to his duty (4,267), and, notoriously, only when he acts like a Stoic, puts duty before love, and determines to abandon her, does he have the adjective *pious* restored to him (4,393). The third crisis is in the fifth book at the burning of the ships, when he thinks of abandoning the whole enterprise (5,700 ff.) to be recalled to his Stoic destiny (*fata*) by Nautes (5,709–10). Only now can he say in technical Stoic language *omnia praecepi* 'I have foreseen everything' (6,105).

The only expression of Epicureanism in *The Aeneid* is put into the mouth of misguided Dido, and patently repudiated. She scorns the idea that the gods intervene, and she is wrong (4,379 *scilicet is superis labor est*). The aim is still peace, but it is governed by destiny (1,205–6 *sedes ubi fata quietas / ostendunt*) and approached through world dominion (6,851–3), the *pax Augusta* again. In Lucretius the eternal wound of love subdues to peace the god of war (Lucretius 1,34); in Vergil the eternal wound of love (however disastrous to Dido and Lavinia) makes Vulcan consent to forge Aeneas's arms (8,394), and Vergil points the change by quotation. To Lucretius Venus is the personification of Epicurean Pleasure; to Vergil she is the mother of Aeneas and arbiter of Rome's destiny. Of course the influence of Lucretius remains strong, but it is verbal echo now rather than imagined thought, and Tenney Frank made too much of vaguely Epicurean phrases and the passing compliment to Memmius (5,117).

Yet Vergil could not completely throw off an attitude of mind so deeply implanted. The Epicureans were alone among Hellenistic philosophic schools in extolling pity as a virtue. Seneca actually called it 'the vice of a feeble mind which succumbs at the sight of suffering in others' (*Clem.* 2,5,1). The man who pities does not enjoy autarcy. His happiness, his peace of mind, depend on circumstances outside his control. But Aeneas is a man of pity. The spectacle of the Trojan War in pictures moves him to cry out in untranslatable words *sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt* (1,462). He pities Dido, even while leaving her. The tears which fall—vainly—like leaves from the sturdy oak are his (4,441–9). The sight of the unburied dead leads him to pity them (6,332). Yes, and he pities Lausus whom his own hand has killed (10,823). The pity does not and cannot lead to action: it is there for its own sake. It is Vergil's residual Epicureanism.

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NOTE

1. This paper is based on a lecture given to the Virgil Society on 12 May 1987.
2. Much of the material is contained within an extended article on

'Epicureanism under the Roman Empire', due for publication in *ANRW*.

3. It is not appropriate to give an extended bibliography of secondary sources. Note among much else:

- Alfonsi, L. 'L'Epicureismo nella storia spirituale di Vergilio' in *Epicurea: In memoriam Hectoris Bignone* (Genoa 1959).
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- De Witt, N. W. 'Vergil and Epicureanism' *CW* 25 (1932) 89 ff. 'Vergil, Augustus and Epicureanism' *CW* 35 (1941-2) 281-2.
- Oroz-Rata, M. J. 'Virgile et l'Epicurisme' in Ass. G. Budé *Actes du VIIIe Congrès* (Paris 1969) 436-47.