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God the Father (himself) in Virgil

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non conferre deo velut aequiperabile quidquam
ausim, nec domino famulum componere signum:
ex minimis sed grande suum voluit pater ipse
coniectare homines, quibus ardua visere non est.

I should not dare to compare anything with god as though it were on a par with him, nor compare with the lord a sign that is his slave: but the father himself willed that men infer his greatness from what is small, since they cannot see the things on high. (Prudentius *Hamartigenia* 79–82)

A good father brings security into the family because of his natural leadership abilities. (Ptyches (1993) 137)

Gott im Himmel—der König auf Erden—der Pfarrer auf der Kanzel—der Ehemann zu Hause.
(Quoted Schneider-Böklen and Vorländer (1991) 125)

If God is male then the male is God. (Daly (1973) 19)

The *telos* is the product of the Father, his speech moves to an end, radiates light, and reaches its goal. Pucci (1992) 29)

quem das finem, rex magne, laborum? (Virgil Aeneid 1.241[1])

There's a stake in your fat black heart
And the villagers never liked you.

> They are dancing and stamping on you.
> They always *knew* it was you.
> Daddy, daddy, you bastard, I'm through.
> (Sylvia Plath *Daddy*)

Nothing could be more familiar than the notion of god as our *father*, enshrined in the Christian tradition in the opening words of the Lord's Prayer, the *Pater noster*. But the fatherhood of god is not of course a notion confined to Christianity; rather, calling god 'father' is, as the long and wide-ranging article on the subject in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* remarks, one of the 'Urphänomenen' of the history of religion. The famous article on god in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* begins with the Australian Aboriginal notion of the 'All-Father', taking aboriginal religion to be the most 'primitive' form of piety and plotting the genealogy of other notions from that most original stem. The cultural preconceptions that that reading of Australian religion implies do not need exposing to a modern sensibility; but there is no getting round the centrality of fatherhood to religious thought in many widely different traditions.

This familiarity of course makes it particularly difficult to see anything of interest in the notion of God the Father; we are trained to think worthy of investigation what is unusual or remarkable, not what is always *pre*supposed. That in itself, from another point of view, makes it important to make the attempt, since it is precisely in the universal and the familiar—in the common ground of what Bourdieu called our *habitus*—that the power of ideology is most manifest. This is even more true for an atheist, who might be deluded into thinking that God the Father disappears with God *himself*, than it is for a believer. But there are three more specific reasons, I think, for taking a second look at the fatherhood of god, especially in relation to ancient Rome.

The first of these is the explosion of interest there has been in recent years in Roman family relations. Categories like 'father' and 'son' have often been taken to be cultural universals, constants against the background of which historical change takes place, archetypes *underlying* temporal and cultural differences. Times may change, but not mother-love. We have learned, however, to be suspicious of all such apparently ahistorical phenomena in the light of history and anthropology. Specifically, works like Laurence Stone's studies of the English family and

Philippe Ariés's book on childhood have encouraged us not to take for granted that the relationships within the family, indeed the very notion of 'family' itself, are unchanging. The great theorist of this historicism was of course Foucault, and the relations between husband and wife are one of the central themes of his *History of Sexuality*. But there has been a mass of detailed work, especially by scholars from Australia and New Zealand, on every aspect of the family.[2]

What has not emerged from these studies, however, is much of a consensus, particularly about the relationship between parents, especially the father, and their children. The Romans themselves saw the father's power—*patria potestas*—as a distinctive feature of their society; as Gaius remarks, *nulli...alii sunt homines, qui talem in liberos habeant potestatem* (*Dig.* 1.9.2). This also struck Greek observers of Roman culture like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who praises this feature of Roman life as a preservation of ancient virtue long since gone from Greece.[3] In accordance with this, some scholars (most notably the great Paul Veyne[4]) have used terms like 'coldness' and 'distance' to characterise the relationship in general between father and child in antiquity. Rather than the happy childhoods (supposedly) enjoyed by modern children, schoolboys in antiquity, according to one scholar, 'were routinely subjected to a litany of horrors that included both corporal punishment and sodomy.'[5] Other scholars, however, have pointed out that there is much evidence on the other side for warmth and intimacy between father and children. Here for instance is one of those synoptic summaries of ancient views on children much beloved by social historians; it is from the Dutch scholar Emiel Eyben, and each sentence is tagged in the original with the appropriate references:

> A father displays his feelings on special occasions when a child—not only a son—is born or dies (even at an early age) but also in more daily occurrences, for example, when a child is ill or has an accident. He cherishes a beautiful child, but an ugly duckling just as well, a sick and unhealthy child no less than a child in good mental and bodily health. He is interested in his son's studies, proud of his (often only alleged) achievements, concerned about his future bride, his name and his fame. A 'real' father enjoys his children, loves them more than his own honour and wealth, even more than his

> own life, does everything he can to win and retain their affection, cherishes high ambition for them, hopes they will be more successful in life than he himself was, is concerned about their material, physical, intellectual, and moral well-being.[6]

Even the much-vaunted *patria potestas* has been argued by Richard Saller in particular to be much less important in practice than in theory, in part because of the chances that one's father would be dead in the ancient world before his theoretical powers could become irksome to an adult male.[7]

The response of historians to this mass of conflicting evidence and argument has for the most part been, as one would expect, to *emplot* it: to see a development from an older, sterner image of fatherhood towards what Suzanne Dixon has termed the 'sentimental ideal of the Roman family'.[8] Naturally also there is no great agreement on exactly *when* these developments took place or on to what other plots one should attempt to map them, but the later Republic/early empire is usually chosen as the locus of change, since it provides so many possibilities for this mapping, above all the 'Roman Cultural Revolution' as some term the beginning of autocratic rule at Rome. We are told, therefore, that 'there is...among those who have studied the issue closely, general agreement that the emotional contact of the two central relationships in Roman society, husband and wife, and parent and child, witnessed a profound change that began in the Republic and climaxed during the first decades of the Principate.'[9]

The choice of this locus of change is obviously of interest for the *Aeneid*, which appears in the middle of this nodal point. But my concern is not with the adequacy or otherwise of this emplotment—which has the merit, or handicap, depending on one's point of view, of being endorsed by many first century BC Romans themselves, as Cicero makes clear in the *Pro Caelio*. Rather I want to stress that however or whenever changes took place, if they did, any picture we construct of the first century BC attitude towards the father will have to contain a great deal of *ambivalence.* The word *pater* is not a simple signifier; especially, again, because it is so central to Roman culture.

One of the arguments used by Richard Saller against those who characterise the relation of father and child only as cold and distant, is

that this characterisation makes the political use of *pater* look very strange:

> If the father had been the severe and repressive figure in Roman culture that Veyne suggests, it would have been odd that emperors were so concerned to represent themselves as *pater* in contrast to *dominus*.[10]

It is this political use of the sign of the father which is my second reason for suggesting that we take another look at God the Father. The notion of the *pater patriae* has of course been much studied by historians, most notably Alföldi,[11] and has recently been discussed in the contexts of modern thought on imperial ideology by T.R. Stevenson.[12] The 'Principate' faced the task of achieving one of those moments of ideological 'energising contradiction', as Charles Martindale terms it,[13] fusing together autocracy and solidarity, and the image of the father, in all its ambivalence, is a productive tool in this welding of the chain. As Stevenson remarks, the model of the father-ruler:

> ...invokes an ideal scenario with connotations which the emperor and his subjects would find mutually congenial (selfless care, absolute loyalty, the absence of exploitation or ingratitude). It signals acceptable terms for the accommodation of overruling individual power. It is sufficiently ambivalent in its connotations to soothe sensibilities on the one hand and yet to recognise the reality of a superior-inferior relationship on the other.

The key term here is again *ambivalence*, a concept widely used in modern discussions of imperial ideology. The ruler as father may be kind and indulgent, or he may punish severely—for the good of the subject, naturally. The point is made forcibly by Seneca in the *De clementia*: the *officium* of the ruler is that *bonorum parentium, qui obiurgare liberos non numquam blande, non numquam minaciter solent, aliquando admonere etiam verberibus* (1.14.1). The utility of the father-image to rulers lies in the combination of attitudes that it encapsulates.

I shall return to the politics of fatherhood, and to what Derrida calls the 'easy passage uniting the three figures of the king, the god, the

father'.[14] But the mention of that trilogy, and who makes the reference, already suggests the third and most important reason why I think god the father at Rome deserves re-examination: the centrality of the (name, Law, figure of) the father to twentieth-century thought, and above all its critique of it/him as a repository of all our negative feelings about authority and power. The father-figure here is obviously Freud, for whom already fatherhood was an enormously complex concept;[15] and it has been in particular through psychoanalytic thought, especially Lacan, that *father* has come to stand for so much more than a male begetter, just as the phallus has become (or has it?) so much more than the male sexual organ. In standing for so much, the father and the phallus have also come, in a sense, to stand for almost nothing—transcendental signifieds almost beyond language into which we pour all our feelings about power and authority. Feminist thought in particular has found in *patriarchy* a convenient master-term for the whole process of male dominance at all levels of human activity.[16] This has naturally had a great effect on the ways in which the fatherhood of god is regarded in theology. In the wake, especially, of Mary Daly's *Beyond God the Father*[17] feminist theologians have offered a searching critique of divine fatherhood.[18] Some Christians have in the past emplotted their own notion of fatherhood as, again, a more gentle 'development' from the supposedly stern Old Testament patriarch of the Jews;[19] it is pleasant to see that plot overturned as feminists have seen in that very notion of the 'good' father an enfeebling mask of power. But the implications of feminist attacks on god the father go much further than this. Older Christian apologists liked to see in the Zeus of Homer or the Jupiter of the *Aeneid* an approximation to the Christian Father-God, a step towards the 'higher' ideal of monotheism. We may reasonably doubt, however, whether paternal autocracy represents a higher stage of civilisation.

The philosopher, however, who has raised the father to the highest level of generality is Derrida, and I want to spend a little more time on him before finally making a move towards some ancient texts. In his essay 'Plato's Pharmacy',[20] beginning from Plato's *Phaedrus* and its account of the invention of writing he developed his famous picture of writing as the *pharmakon*, the cure and the poison. Plato had said that writing always needs the help of the father: it is thus the 'miserable son' (145), 'weakened' speech, something not completely dead; a living dead, a reprieved corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of breath' (143). Speech,

in the terms of this opposition, represents 'presence', real communication: and as Derrida remarks, 'being-there is always a property of paternal speech. And the site of a fatherland' (146). But if writing on this view is secondary, a redundant extra, it is also a threat: (77) 'From the position of the holder of the scepter, the desire for writing is indicated, designated, and denounced as a desire for orphanhood and patricidal subversion.' Derrida, famously, reversed the terms of this genealogy: writing precedes speech, in that this desire for *presence*, for *authority*, for some guarantor of meaning in the face of the shifting signs of writing, is always illusory. In this sense, the father is never there. But in another sense, the father is always present, inescapably, as one pole of an opposition engenders another and has authority over it. The sign of the West is thus the sign of the father, in that in all the oppositions which embody the Western tradition from truth v. error to men v. women, one term has had fatherly care of the other. We can deconstruct these oppositions, we can flip them to subvert patriarchal authority, but we shall never be able fully to escape them. In this respect the 'Father of Logos' will always win, will indeed always already have won. Again, his power lies in its arbitrary nature: we cannot get behind the father's authority to question it, we must simply accept that it is so.

Let me try to single out some aspects of the concept which are suggested by the sketch I have just offered. First, the sign of the father has been traced from human paternity through king and god to the most general level of human thought. These aspects of the father cannot be kept separate; they interconnect, there is this 'easy passage' between them. This is most obvious with the more concrete concepts of the Roman father, ruler, and god, nicely united in the ambiguity of Virgil's words on Nisus and Euryalus in *Aeneid* 9.446–9:

> *Fortunati ambo! si quid mea carmina possunt,*
> *nulla dies umquam memori vos eximet aevo,*
> *dum domus Aeneae Capitoli immobile saxum*
> *accolet imperiumque pater Romanus habebit.*

imperiumque pater Romanus habebit. As Conington and Nettleship point out, it is difficult to decide here between Augustus, Jupiter, and the generic 'Roman father' of *patria potestas*. All three are plausible in the context.[21] But the broad Derridan notion of the father is also implicated

in this, because of the second important aspect of fatherhood, its *authority*. Power is always with the father, and in particular the speech of the father, the words of the Lord—*fatum*, what the father *says*. The words of the father, moreover, bring order and peace through this authority; meaning is settled, disputes are resolved, the forces of disorder and anarchy are kept in check. Paternity, as the author of a recent critique of this 'paternal romance' puts it, is 'configured and projected in Western texts as an origin of culture and world-order, and as a guarantor of cultural law and justice.'[22]

But always, and this is my third point, this paternal authority is ambivalent. Ambivalence is not, of course, incoherence, but may be figured as a productive way of dealing with the pull of conflicting images. It is in this sense that the ambivalence of the *princeps* as father is seen by many historians. Yet Stevenson himself, in taking this line, notes that it is not easy to control this ambivalence:

> The father/tyrant antithesis attempts to give the two sides of the continuum separate images, but there is a certain uncomfortable fluidity between them. Zeus' forcefulness, like the *potestas* of Seneca's *paterfamilias*...is not necessarily at odds with the image of a gentle father who clearly matches the ideal benefactor, even if it is something of an embarrassment?[23]

We must beware—as always—of a compliant functionalism which makes all the images of the father work together. One of the great strengths of feminist scholarship is to remind us constantly that neither the Roman Republic nor the Empire (what some call the Principate) *worked* at all, if one is prepared to consider the views of that half of the society who could never aspire to paternity. The word of the father which controls disorder is, as I have remarked, almost by definition arbitrary, a mask for violence; if it had reason on its side, why does it need to speak with *authority*? Fathers are meant to be obeyed without question; but why should an adult person ever simply do *as she is told*?

Some of the implications of these very general remarks for the reading of the *Aeneid* may already be obvious, but let me make them explicit. It is clear that the ambivalent power of the father-god can be read in more than one way. In a sense, seeing Jupiter as a father solves the

problems of the *Aeneid*. As father, Jupiter has a care for men; as Antonie Wlosok points out, when we first meet him in the poem it is *talis iactantem pectore curas* (1.227), like *pater Aeneas* full of 'väterliche Fürsorge'. But a father must punish as well, must use not only the thunderbolt but even the *Dirae*, the instruments of his wrath 'zur Wohnung der gültigen Weltordnung', to keep the peace and enforce law and order.[24] Like the good father Augustus, Jupiter is not a tyrant, but what he says, his *fatum*, goes.

Alternatively, however, as in traditional 'two-voices' criticism, we can try to read the sign of the father *ourselves*, in a different way, and press for a stronger ambivalence. It is notoriously unclear in the *Aeneid* whether *fatum* is just what Jupiter says or something external. One reason we find it hard to adjudicate here is that unlike Ovid's Jupiter at the end of the *Metamorphoses*,[25] Jupiter never offers to show the big book of fate to anyone. The master-narrative really is here in the mind of god, and Jupiter's utterances escape from the hazards of textuality to attain real presence; what happens is what Jupiter says, and what he says is what he means. One way of 'reading' this is as a mystification of power. R. Con Davis[26] remarks that 'the paternal romance in early Western culture puts the father in the position of seeming to be the origin of "everything", even the narrative practice that produced him' but in another sense the Father is always trying to pretend that there is something behind him, some law or higher authority of which he is only the transmitter. To see through this is in a sense NOT to see *through* the Father. On this view, beyond the book of fate would then be no more than the *ipse dixit* of the tyrant. Within the *Aeneid*, other readers, most notably Juno, try and fail to read the book of fate differently; but we do not have to cooperate with that failure. In our own cross-reading, we need not take the father's word for it.

But one thing that we have learned from Foucault and Greenblat is that 'simple' rebellion against the father, the 'simple' rebel-without-a-cause heroics of *Paradise Lost* Book One, only reinforce Big Daddy's power. It is more important to try to deconstruct the oppositions which *really* embody that power. The gendered opposition in the *Aeneid* of Jupiter and Juno is framed in terms, again, of all those Western binaries, 'culture/nature, truth/error, inside/outside, health/disease, man/woman, procreation/birthing'.[27] The task is not to champion one against the other, but to try to get behind the presuppositions which underlie

these genealogies, to try to get back to the point *before* the father has already won. And this is a task both necessary and impossible—or, as I should prefer to say, impossible and *necessary*.

But I am not going to do this here: after this mountainous prologue, the mouse. I do—despite appearances—want to say something specific about the *Aeneid*. Indeed, I want to say something about the father himself, *pater ipse*, what Jesus called πατὴρ αὐτός not just *that* father, *Iuppiter ille*, what Jesus called (?) πατὴρ ἐκεῖνος.[28] But the presence of this father may well prove illusory; perhaps I will only be talking about a pronoun. I want simply to challenge David West's translation of *Aeneid* 2.617–18, in the apocalyptic revelation that Venus offers Aeneas during the fall of Troy:

> *ipse pater Danais animos virisque secundos*
> *sufficit, ipse deos in Dardana suscitat arma.*

West translates this, 'the Father of the Gods himself puts heart into the Greeks and gives them strength.' I think that *pater* means 'father', not 'Father of the Gods'; *the* father, himself, αὐτός.

Now of course Jupiter is the father of the gods, (just listed before in the passage of *Aeneid* 2 in question), and the father of Venus, *pater ipse deorum* as Germanicus terms him.[29] So Cicero translates the formulaic πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε by *pater ipse Iuppiter*.[30] In many contexts, this idea may be to the fore, as for instance in the divine assembly in the first book of Statius' *Thebaid* (1.201–5), where the gods await their father's gesture before sitting down:

> *mediis sese arduus infert*
> ipse *deis placido quatiens tamen omnia vultu*
> *stellantique locat solio; nec protinus ausi*
> *caelicolae, veniam donec pater ipse sedendi*
> *tranquilla iubet esse manu.*

Even there, of course, as with all the divine assemblies of Imperial Literature, there is another Father in the background; and in general it is difficult to say what *pater* means, not in the sense of some controlled ambiguity but rather through a leakage of sense, a feeling that the word which carries all the semantic weight in these contexts is not *pater* but

ipse. The first two occurrences of the collocation *pater ipse* of god[31] in Latin poetry are both in Cicero, though it would not be surprising if the phrase had occurred in Ennius: both show the problem. One is from the *Marius*, fr. 7 Traglia (9–12):

> *Hanc ubi propetibus pinnis lapsuque volantem*
> *conspexit Marius, divini numinis augur,*
> *faustaque signa suae laudis reditusque notavit,*
> *partibus intonuit caeli pater ipse sinistris.*

The other is from the *De consulatu*, fr. 11 Traglia (36–8):

> *Nam* pater *altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo*
> ipse *suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit*
> *et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis.*

Neither of these passages is difficult to translate. In the first, Marius is rewarded with a sign not just from any god but from Jupiter *himself*, the very father of the sky. Similarly in the second, the importance of the prodigy is shown by the fact that Jupiter *himself* takes a hand in the revelation, rather than leaving it to mediation. As Cicero remarks earlier in the same fragment, 31–2:

> *Haec fore perpetuis signis clarisque frequentans*
> ipse deum genitor *caelo terrisque canebat.*

The sign[32] of the father *himself* is the sign of a *presence*, of an unmediated truth: so Aeneas prays the Sibyl in *Aeneid* 6.76 not to entrust her prophecies to writing, but *ipsa canas oro*. As Statius remarks (*Theb.* 1.213) *vocem fata sequuntur*, 'fate follows the *voice*'. But does *pater* in the Cicero examples mean anything? To put it another way, how paternal is he in these revelations of fate? It is interesting to see what happens to Cicero's *ipse deum genitor* tag in the *Aeneid*. It turns up in Juno's speech in *Aeneid* 7, where she is indignant that even the father of the gods allowed Calydon to be destroyed (304–7):

> *Mars perdere gentem*
> *immanem Lapithum valuit, concessit in iras*

ipse deum *antiquam* genitor *Calydona Dianae,*
quod scelus aut Lapithas tantum aut Calydona merentem?

If Jupiter is here firmly the father *of the gods*, there is still something *unfatherly* in his act, which makes us think that he is also—is he not?—the father of men.

Let me return to that passage of *Aeneid* 2, where the father himself was helping the Greeks. Three passages of the *Georgics* are recalled. The closest of these is from the description of Jupiter's anger against men, when he reveals the power of his thunderbolt (1.328–31):

ipse pater *media nimborum in nocte corusca*
fulmina molitur dextra, quo maxima motu
terra tremit, fugere ferae et mortalia corda
per gentis humilis stravit pavor.

As has often been observed, however, the passage is balanced by a later one in which the beneficence of the father's signs are stressed (1.351–5):

Atque haec ut certis possemus discere signis,
aestusque pluviasque et agentis frigora ventos,
ipse pater *statuit quid menstrua luna moneret,*
quo signo caderent Austri, quid saepe videntes
agricolae propius stabulis armenta tenerent.

And finally the mediation between these aspects of the father may be provided by the description of Jupiter's plan for the improvement of mankind at the beginning of the book (1.121–4):

pater ipse *colendi*
haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem
movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda
nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.

How one reads this trio of course depends on how one reads the *Georgics*, as well as vice versa; one may stress paternal care or arbitrary violence, one may take to the image of the father doing all this for our own good, or one may find it terrifying. Rather than rehearsing these familiar

arguments, I will merely draw attention to a point that has been made by Alessandro Schiesaro[33] about the *epistemology* of the *Georgics*, especially in relation to the second passage 1.351–5. One of the differences between the *Georgics* and its Lucretian model, according to Schiesaro, is that in the *De rerum natura* the didactic addressee is encouraged to find solutions for himself, whereas the *Georgics* is both more sceptical and more authoritarian about knowledge. It is hard to find certainty for oneself; one can do no more than listen to the experts. And obviously he wishes to connect this shift with the shift in cultural values of which the beginnings of the empire are part. Lucretius too had followed a father, Epicurus *ipse pater veri* (Petron. *Sat.* 132.7), but there was also a stress on independence generated by the possibility of knowledge. In the more post-modern world of the *Georgics*, knowledge is in the depths, and authority therefore all the more important. On this line of argument, it is not difficult to guess who is the real father here, the *pater* not of truth but of the Fatherland.

The implication of those passages of the *Georgics* in the revelation of *Aeneid* 2 makes it impossible to restrict *pater ipse* there to the Father of the Gods. It is the father himself who lends authority here to the Greeks' destruction of Troy, our father in heaven whose fatherly care is here perverted—doubtless for the good of mankind, for the *fata* which decree the fall of Troy and the rise of Rome. This is borne out too by the Homeric intertexts, the removal of the mist from Diomedes' eyes in *Iliad* 5.127–8 and from Ajax's in *Iliad* 17.626–50, passages with a long philosophical progeny in the rhetoric of blindness and sight.[34] Although Venus is more like Athene in *Iliad* 5, it is the second passage which is more important for *Aeneid* 2:

> Nor was it unseen by great-hearted Aias how Zeus shifted
> the strength of the fighting toward the Trojans, nor by Menelaos.
> First
> of the two to speak was huge Telamonian Aias:
> 'Shame on it! By now even one with a child's innocence
> could see how *father Zeus himself is helping the Trojans*.
> The weapons of each of these take hold, no matter who throws them,
> good fighter or bad, since Zeus is straightening all of them
> equally,
> while ours fall to the ground and are utterly useless. Therefore

> let us deliberate with ourselves upon the best counsel,
> how at the same time to rescue the dead body, and also
> win back ourselves, and bring joy to our beloved companions
> who look our way and sorrow for us, and believe no longer
> that the fury of manslaughtering Hektor, his hand irresistible,
> can be held, but must be driven on to the black ships.
> But there should be some companion who could carry the message
> quickly to Peleus' son, since I think he has not heard
> the ghastly news, how his beloved companion has fallen.
> Yet I cannot make out such a man amongst the Achaians, since they are
> held by the mist alike, the men and their horses.
> *Father Zeus, draw free from the mist the sons of the Achaians,*
> make bright the air, and give sight back to our eyes; in shining
> daylight destroy us, if to destroy us be now your pleasure.'
> He spoke thus, and as he wept the father took pity upon him,
> and forthwith scattered the mist and pushed the darkness back from them... (*Iliad* 17.626–49, trans. Lattimore)

Ajax's prayer to Zeus (645) is based on his apprehension that anyone—even a fool—can see that 'Father Zeus himself is helping the Trojans', Τρώεσσι πατὴρ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀρήγει (630). In answer, 'the father had pity on him as he wept τὸν δὲ πατὴρ ὀλοφύρατο δάκρυ χέοντα (648). Ajax can see that the father is helping the Trojans, but is rewarded with a paternal act of pity from Zeus; Aeneas is given to see that the father himself is helping the Greeks, as a special act of providence from his mother. The proof for Ajax that the father is helping the Trojans is that the Greek spear-throws get nowhere, but Zeus 'guides aright' (632) all the casts of the Trojans. The father's presence and authority guarantee success, the right target, the right meaning—but, as in the *Aeneid*, for the wrong side.

It is noticeable that the Latin passages are associated especially with augury, and it is possible that the phrase *pater ipse* occurred in augural usage, or that a prominent passage in e.g. Ennius' *Annales* used it of confirmation by or of a portent. Normally the gods work indirectly in their dealings with men, through dark oracles or surrogates, and the meaning of their warnings and threats is unclear and ambiguous. Sometimes, however, they speak and act *themselves*, with full presence

in their utterance, and this is above all the prerogative of the father, Jupiter himself. The opposition between directness and indirectness is again gendered; women are forced always into subterfuge and periphrasis, men can come right out and say what they mean (and mean what they say). This fact was not lost on Juno, when she took matters into her own hands in *Aeneid* 7 (620–2):

> *tum* regina deum *caelo delapsa morantis*
> *impulit* ipsa *manu portas, et cardine uerso*
> *Belli ferratos rumpit Saturnia postis.*

Virgil innovates in having Juno open the gates of war, or, to be more exact, Juno innovates in deciding to act the man and do it herself: the queen of heaven aspires to the directness of the father (who focalises *regina deum*?[35]), and like him shatters the temples of men with a bolt from the blue. The representative of narrative *mora*[36] acts to remove another obstacle to the plot—just like a woman trying to be just like a man.

In *Aeneid* 2, not the father of the gods but the father himself is helping the Greeks. A productive paradox, or a sign that the sign of the father is hopelessly split? Holding these fathers together is notoriously difficult for religions: Manicheanism will give up the attempt and unashamedly offer us two divine fathers, the grim creator and the loving saviour, and even Christianity may divide the responsibility between the Father and the Son (not to mention the Holy Ghost). The Romans were more monotheistic, more attracted to the unity of the *pater Romanus* and traditional family values. A modern atheist may feel that she has given this father up, that with the disappearance of god himself, and with the unchaining of that semi-deictic *ipse* from any reference, the father has also disappeared. But god the father is less easy to be rid of, if we understand him as the locus of authority, the (male) being who by his words determines meaning, who fashions *fatum* with his *ipse dixit*, who decides whose spear-casts succeed and whose fail. To *try* even to give up *that* father in heaven is much more difficult, the implications much more radical. It may not, indeed, be possible; but, again, I am sure that it is worthwhile.

Jesus College, Oxford **D.P. FOWLER**

NOTES

1. Cf. Feeney (1991) 137–8.
2. For surveys of recent work, see Bradley (1993) and Saller (1994), esp. 102–153: in addition to the latter, major studies include Evans (1991), Eyben (1993), Gardner and Wiedemann (1991), Kertzer and Saller (1991), and Rawson (1991a).
3. *Ant. Rom.* 2.26.1 ff., esp. §4.
4. Veyne (1978), (1987).
5. Evans (1991) 169.
6. Eyben (1991) 118–9
7. Saller (1991), and now esp. (1994).
8. Dixon (1991).
9. Evans (1991) 179.
10. Saller (1991) 165 n. 33: cf. Saller (1994), esp. 151–3.
11. Alföldi (1952).
12. Stevenson (1992).
13. Martindale (1994) 51.
14. Derrida (1981) 76.
15. Cf. Assoun (1989), Pucci (1992) 2–3.
16. See especially the essays by S. Rowbotham and S. Alexander and B. Taylor in Samuel (1981); Pateman (1988).
17. Daly (1973).
18. See for example the essays in Mek and Schillebeeckx (1981) and Kimel (1992), especially J. Martin Soskice's 'Can a Feminist call God Father?'.
19. On attempts to ground this in Jesus' use of *abba*, see the suggestively titled 'Abba isn't Daddy', Barr (1988). For some of the anti-semitic undertones of pseudo-feminist anti-judaism, see Brumlik (1986).
20. Derrida (1981).
21. The reference to the Capitol in 448 points to Jupiter, but the *domus Aeneae* pushes us towards Augustus and his successors, and the general nature of the prophecy suggests reading *pater Romanus* as a general 'Roman father'. As Hardie (1994) remarks ad loc., 'it may be preferable not to confine the resonance of these phrases.'
22. Davis (1993) 3.
23. Stevenson (1992) 432–3.
24. Wlosok (1983) 200.
25. *Met.* 15.807–15, where Venus is offered the opportunity to go look at the book of fate in the archives of the Three Sisters; but she has no need to, as Jupiter himself has read it and can tell her, *ne sis etiamnum* (i.e. after the *Aeneid*) *ignara futuri* (815). I discuss the implications of this passage elsewhere.
26. Davis (1993) 15.
27. Davis (1993) 141.
28. John 5.37, 12.49, ὁ πέμψας με πατὴρ ἐκεῖνος/αὐτός (where the text should presumably be regularised to one or the other); for the Latin phrase *pater ille deum*, see Austin on *Aen.* 2.779, Harrison on *Aen.* 10.875.
29. *Phaen.* 542. Cf. Martial 9.3.6 *pater ipse deum.*
30. *De Fato* fr. 3 = *Poet.* fr. 67 Traglia.
31. Cf. Catull. 64.21 (linked to 62.60–1); cf. Stat. *Theb.* 9.71–2, and *Aen.* 5.241 (Portunus), Sen. *Phaed.* 717, Val. Fl. 2.605, 4.571 (Neptune), Stat. *Theb.* 2.217–8

(Inachus), Sil. It. 9.187 (Eridanus).

32. Cf. *Aen.* 6.780 *pater ipse suo superum iam* signat *honore* with Austin ad loc., Putnam (1985).

33. In a paper forthcoming in the proceedings of the conference *The Roman Cultural Revolution* edited by him and T. Habinek.

34. See Mayor, Courtney on Juvenal 10.3–4 *remota / erroris nebula*, especially the discussion in Plato *Alc.* 2.150d.

35. Cf. *Aen.* 1.9 (with the brilliant comment of [Sen.] *Oct.* 200–210)

36. Cf. 7.315, Feeney (1991) 146–7.

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